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Ships, including floating production, storage, and offloading (FPSO) vessels, have always required ballast to
operate safely. Long back in time, ships carried solid ballast in the form of rocks, sand, or other heavy
materials. Today, water is commonly used for ballasting, as water can be easily added or removed to different
sections of the hull to compensate for any changes in stability or cargo load. A FPSO must, for example,
adjust ballasting of water according to how it is being loaded with hydrocarbon products. Failure to ballast
properly may lead to a major accident, involving multiple fatalities, release to environment, and loss of vessel.
Assessments of ballasting systems are therefore needed to verify that the systems are sufficiently safe and
reliable.
The main objective of this thesis is to suggest an approach for how reliability assessments of ballasting
systems should be carried out, including recommendations to how reliability requirements are being set for
this type of systems.
The master thesis is carried out in collaboration with Teekay, the owner and operator of several FPSO vessels
worldwide.
As part of the master thesis, the candidate shall:
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2. Document a literature survey on reported safety and reliability challenges and incidents/accidents
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4. Define and discuss concepts like safe state and desired behavior upon fault conditions for
ballasting systems.
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5. Identify particular issues of relevance for reliability performance of ballasting systems, for
example the possibility for having common cause failures (CCFs).
6. Identify and discuss relevant methods for defining reliability requirements for ballasting systems.
7. Suggest an approach for how the reliability of a ballasting system may be determined, including
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reference, list of literature etc. The text should be clear and concise, and include the necessary references to
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in the text.
Equipment and software developed during the project is a part of the fulfilment of the task. Unless outside
parties have exclusive property rights or the equipment is physically non-moveable, it should be handed in
along with the final report. Suitable documentation for the correct use of such material is also required as part
of the final report.
The candidate shall follow the work regulations at the company’s plant. The candidate may not intervene in
the production process in any way. All orders for specific intervention of this kind should be channelled
through company’s plant management.
The student must cover travel expenses, telecommunication, and copying unless otherwise agreed.
If the candidate encounters unforeseen difficulties in the work, and if these difficulties warrant a reformation
of the task, these problems should immediately be addressed to the Department.
The assignment text shall be enclosed and be placed immediately after the title page.
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Summary and Conclusions
Ballast systems perform important safety functions on ships and floating facilities, and failure
to ballast properly may lead to a major accident, involving multiple fatalities, release to envi-
ronment and loss of vessel. Assessments are therefore needed to verify that the systems are
sufficiently safe and reliable. The main objective of the thesis is to suggest a reliability assess-
ment approach for ballast systems, including recommendations to how reliability requirements
should be set for this type of system.
A combination of literature surveys provide the background for the reliability assessment ap-
proach. Previous work related to reliability of ballast systems is presented, followed by a pre-
sentation of the main regulations related to the systems. The third literature survey document
the reported safety and reliability challenges, incidents and accidents related to ballast sys-
tems.
As a basis for the detailed reliability assessment approach a typical ballast system on a ship
shaped vessel is presented. The safety critical functions of the system are identified and the
system is analyzed with regards to its role as a safety barrier system. The ballast system is subse-
quently classified as a safety instrumented system capable of protecting the vessel from hazards
that may lead to loss of stability and draft. A hazard analysis is used to assess the adequacy of
the barrier system, and the result of the analysis show that there are multiple hazards that may
lead to loss of stability and draft, and that although the frequency of occurence might be low,
the associated consequences can be very high.
A comparison between different methods for assigning reliability performance requirements
to ballast system functions is presented, based on two different approaches recommended by
the international IEC61508 standard and the Norwegian OLF-070 guideline, respectively. A rec-
ommendation is made to assign minimum reliability performance requirements to the ballast
system functions, based on the approach presented in the guideline. A proposed set of reliability
performance requirements are presented.
Potential failure causes and failure modes that may influence the reliability performance of bal-
last system functions are identified through a safety barrier failure analysis. As part of the anal-
ysis a failure mode, effect and criticality analysis of the main components is conducted.
The proposed reliability assessment approach is presented as a practical stepwise procedure to
be used when quantifying the reliability performance of the safety functions performed by a
ballast system. The approach is based on a reliability block diagram technique where poten-
tial common cause failures among the components can be included in the calculations. The
approach is developed to give conservative estimates for the reliability performance, and may
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be used as part of a verification process of ballast system reliability, as decision support during
the design phase of new systems or to quantify the effect of reliability enhancing efforts in the
operational phase.
In addition to the reliability assessment approach, a defence approach against common cause
failures in ballast systems is presented. The defence approach focus on the efforts that can be
made in the operational phase during maintentance and testing, to reduce the influence and
reoccurence of common cause failures.
Finally, the proposed reliability assessment approach is applied to the ballast system of the
Petrojarl Foinaven floating production, storage and offloading vessel as a case example of the
approach. The case example show that the proposed reliability performance requirements can
be achieved by performing functional tests of the ballast system components at regular inter-
vals, and that the stepwise procedure may also identify important improvement potentials for
ballast systems.
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Sammendrag
Ballastsystemer utfører viktige sikkerhetsfunksjoner ombord på skip og flytende installasjoner,
og feil under ballasteringsoperasjoner kan føre til storulykker, med tap av menneskeliv, utslipp
til miljøet og tap av fartøy. Det er derfor behov for pålitelighetsvurderinger for å verifisere at
systemene er tilstrekkelig sikre og pålitelige. Hovedmålet med masteroppgaven er å foreslå en
pålitelighetsvurderingsmetode for ballastsystemer, i tillegg til å foreslå hvordan pålitelighetskrav
skal settes for slike systemer.
En kombinasjon av litteraturstudier danner bakgrunnen for pålitelighetsvurderingsmetoden.
Tidligere arbeid knyttet til pålitelighet av ballastsystemer er presentert, fulgt av en presentasjon
av de mest sentrale forskriftene som gjelder for ballastssystemer. Det tredje litteraturstudiet
dokumenterer de rapporterte sikkerhet- og pålitelighetsutfordringene, hendelsene og ulykkene
knyttet til ballastsystemer.
Som en basis for den detaljerte pålitelighetsvurderingsmetoden presenteres et typisk ballast sys-
tem installert på et skip. De sikkerhetskritiske funksjonene i systemet er identifisert og systemet
er analysert i forhold til rollen det utfører som et sikkerhetsbarriere system. Ballastsystemet er
deretter klassifisert som et instrumentert sikkerhetssystem som kan beskytte fartøyet fra farek-
ilder som kan lede til tap av stabilitet og dypgang. En farekildeanalyse er benyttet for å vur-
dere tilstrekkeligheten av barriere systemet, og resultatet av analysen viser at det finnes en rekke
farekilder som kan lede til tap av stabilitet og dypgang, og at selv om hendelsesfrekvensen muli-
gens er lav, så kan de tilhørende konsekvensene være veldig høye.
En sammenligning mellom forskjellige metoder for å angi ytelseskrav for pålitelighet til bal-
lastsystemer er presentert, basert på to forskjellig metoder anbefalt av henholdsvis den inter-
nasjonale IEC61508 standarden og den norske retningslinjen OLF-070. Det er videre anbefalt
at minimumskrav til pålitelighetsytelse bør angis til de forskjellige ballastsystemfunksjonene
basert på metoden presentert i den overnevnte retningslinjen. Et sett med krav til pålitelighet-
sytelse er foreslått.
Potensielle feilårsaker og feilmodi som kan påvirke pålitelighetsytelsen til ballastsystemfunksjonene
er identifisert gjennom en feilanalyse av sikkerhetsbarrieren. Som en del av analysen ble det ut-
ført en feilmodi, effekt og kritikalitetsanalyse av hovedkomponentene i systemet.
Den foreslåtte pålitelighetsvurderingsmetoden er presentert som en praktisk stegvis metode
som kan benyttes for å kvantifisere pålitelighetsytelsen av sikkerhetsfunksjonene i et ballastsys-
tem. Metoden er basert på pålitelighets blokkdiagrammer hvor potensialet for fellesfeil mellom
komponentene kan inkluderes i beregningene.
Metoden er utviklet til å gi konservative estimater for pålitelighetsytelsen, og kan brukes som
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en del av en verifikasjonsprosess for pålitelighet av et ballastsystem, som verktøy for beslut-
ningsstøtte i designfasen av nye systemer eller for å kvantifisere effekten av pålitelighetsfrem-
mende tiltak i operasjonsfasen.
I tillegg til pålitelighetsvurderingsmetoden, presenteres en forsvarmetode mot fellesfeil i bal-
lastsystemer. Forsvarsmetoden fokuserer på tiltak som kan gjøres i operasjonsfasen under ved-
likehold og testing for å redusere effekten av, og muligheten for tilbakefall av fellesfeil i sys-
temet.
Til slutt presenteres pålitelighetsvurderingsmetoden gjennom et anvendelseseksempel hvor meto-
den benyttes for å analysere ballastsystemet på det flytende produksjonsskipet Petrojarl Foinaven.
Anvendelseseksempelet viser at de foreslåtte kravene til pålitelighetsytelse kan oppnås ved å ut-
føre regelmessige funksjonstester av komponentene i ballastsystemet, og at den stegvise meto-
den også kan identifisere viktige forbedringspotensialer for ballast systemer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Ballast systems perform important safety functions on ships and floating facilities, and FPSO
vessels are especially dependent on their ballast systems to adjust the stability and draft ac-
cording to how the vessel is loaded and unloaded with hydrocarbon products. Failure to ballast
properly may lead to a major accident, involving multiple fatalities, release to the environment
and loss of vessel as in the Ocean Ranger accident in 1982, and the recent incident with the
Petrobras P-34 FPSO in 2002.
Despite the major accident potential of unsuccessful ballast operations, the requirements to re-
liability assessments and reliability performance of these systems are not regulated as strict as
other systems in the offshore industry. Ballast systems are usually subject to traditional pre-
scriptive maritime regulations, where requirements to reliability performance is limited. This
may be about to change, as regulatory initiatives have been made to include ballast systems
under performance based offshore regulations. The first step was taken by the OLF070 (2004)
guideline used in the Norwegian offshore industry in 2004. The guideline assigned a reliabil-
ity performance requirement to ballast systems, which to this day represent the state-of-the-art
with regards to requirements for ballast system reliability performance.
This thesis is concerned with the need for improved reliability assessments methods and relia-
bility performance requirements to verify that ballast systems are sufficiently safe and reliable
for daily operation, as well as in emergency situations.
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1.1.1 Objective
The main objective of the thesis is to suggest an approach for how reliability assessments of bal-
last systems should be carried out, including recommendations to how reliability requirements
are being set for this type of system.
As part of the master thesis, the following shall be covered:
• Give a thorough description of ballasting system types, their main functions, and interface
with other systems onboard the FPSO.
• Document a literature survey on reported safety and reliability challenges and incidents/accidents
in relation to ballasting systems.
• Identify and classify safety-critical functions of a ballasting system.
• Define and discuss concepts like safe state and desired behavior upon fault conditions for
ballasting systems.
• Identify particular issues of relevance for reliability performance of ballasting systems, for
example the possibility for having common cause failures (CCFs).
• Identify and discuss relevant methods for defining reliability requirements for ballasting
systems.
• Suggest an approach for how the reliability of a ballasting system may be determined,
including the analysis of CCFs.
• Suggest an approach for preventing CCFs in relation to ballasting systems, including de-
sign related issues and operational/maintenance related issues.
• Identify and discuss challenges in relation to reliability assessments, for which further re-
search is needed.
1.1.2 Limitations
The study is limited to ballast systems installed on ship shaped vessels.
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1.1.3 Structure of the Report
The report is structured as follows
• Chapter 1 provides the background information and problem formulation, objectives and
limitations, description of the structure of the report and a presentation of previous work
within the field of ballast system reliability.
• Chapter 2 present the regulations and requirements related to ballast systems on floating
facilities operating on the NCS.
• Chapter 3 begins with a description of a typical ballast system and the functions of the
system. The main components are described in detail, and the ballast system is classi-
fied as a SIS. A barrier analysis and safety barrier failure analysis is presented. The final
part of the chapter is a presentation of the relevant methods that can be used to assign
reliability requirements to ballast systems, and a proposed set of reliability performance
requirements for the ballast system functions.
• Chapter 4 document the reported safety and reliability challenges, incidents and acci-
dents related to ballast systems.
• Chapter 5 present the proposed stepwise reliability assessment method based on a relia-
bility block diagram technique followed by a common cause failure defence approach for
the operational phase of a ballast system.
• Chapter 6 presents the reliability assessment approach through a case example conducted
on the ballast system of the Petrojarl Foinaven FPSO.
1.2 Literature Survey
The literature survey is divided into three parts. The first part document the previous work
related to reliability assessments of ballast systems, presented in the following section. The sec-
ond part present the regulations governing ballasting systems on the NCS in Chapter 2. The
third part present the reported safety and reliability challenges, incidents and accidents related
to ballast systems in Chapter 4.
Not alot of research has been carried out within the field of reliability assessments of ballast sys-
tems. The accident reports following the Ocean Ranger accident in 1982, mark the beginning
of the literature survey. These reports clearly pointed out the critical importance of ballast sys-
tem integrity, and sparked an increased focus on stability and ballast system reliability in the
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offshore industry. In response to the accident, the classification society DNV performed an in-
vestigation of the ballast system on a sister platform to the Ocean Ranger, and the investigation
stressed the importance of improved documentation of ballast systems and how it responded
to different interventions by the operator (Østby et al., 1987).
Through the RABL-Risk Assessment Of Buoyancy Loss (RABL) (Østby et al., 1987) research pro-
gramme from 1986-87, the reliability of ballast systems on mobile platform concepts were sub-
ject to various assessments. The RABL programme was a joint industry project aimed at devel-
oping an analysis procedure for definition of accidental conditions and loads related to loss of
buoyancy for mobile drilling platforms, and one of the projects focused on ballast systems. A
risk assessment model for evaluation of ballast system failures and subsequent loss of buoyancy
was developed, and reliability data for ballast systems were gathered. The data is presented in
appendix Figure B.2.
Interestingly, the RABL project concluded that the probability of a critical accidental situation
due to technical failures in the ballast system, including power supply and instrumentation, was
so low that contemporary ballast system designs were in compliance with the proposed accep-
tance criteria, and that efforts should rather be put into detailed verification of ballast systems.
The project furthermore supported the use of the mandatory Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA) technique during design, and that other methods, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
should only be performed if a lack of system redundancy or possible common cause failures
had been identified (Østby et al., 1987).
With the introduction of FPSOs into harsh weather environments in the North Sea, with Petro-
jarl 1 as the first in 1986, the requirements applicable to FPSOs, including risk analysis, reliabil-
ity studies and stability evaluations became a subject of attention. The clash of the requirement
regimes is described in a paper prepared by DNV, Baunan (1996). The field of FPSO safety be-
came well represented in literature, but mostly related to collisions risks, risks associated with
the topside equipment, and techniques for using risk assessments as a design tool, e.g. Mac-
Donald et al. (1999), Nesje et al. (1999), Overfield and Collins (2000), Vinnem et al. (2000), Vin-
nem (2000), Leonhardsen et al. (2001), Chen and Moan (2003), OGP (2006), Chen et al. (2007),
Tronstad (2009).
Following the accident with the semi-submersible production platform Petrobras P-36 in 2001,
and the incident with the Petrobras P-34 FPSO in 2002, the state owned Brazilian oil company
Petrobras issued an Excellency Operational Program (PEO) with a series of tasks to improve
the safety and operational reliability of its platforms (Rocha et al., 2010). The effort resulted
in a qualitative methodology for risk and reliability analysis of the interaction between ballast
and loading systems, electric and hydraulic power systems and associated control systems on
production platforms. The methodology became mandatory for all new floating production
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projects in 2005. Based on one of these qualitative analysis, Rocha et al. (2010) presents a quan-
titative functional reliability study, based on a FMECA and fault tree analysis. Perhaps the most
interesting result of the article is the explicit recommendation that the least reliable component
from the study, the equivalent to the vessel control system, should be subject to a safety integrity
level (SIL) analysis based on the IEC 61511 standard.
Safety integrity analysis has been used in the North Sea offshore petroleum industry for over
a decade, and on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), the OLF-070 guideline, presented
in Section 2.0.3, represent the state-of-the art when it comes to reliability requirements and
verification of ballast systems on offshore facilities. Since 2004, the guideline has prescribed
minimum safety integrity level requirements for ballast systems, further discussed in Section
3.3.
Risk analysis and reliability assessments are related, and Vinnem et al. (2006) argues that apart
from analysis of ship collisions, risk analysis of maritime systems on offshore facilities, includ-
ing ballast systems, are normally extraordinarily simple and superficial, compared to the com-
prehensive analysis performed on petrochemical process equipment and in relation to drilling
operations. Vinnem et al. (2006) recommends the use of FTA and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) as
part of a ballast system risk analysis process. In Hansen (2007), FTA is applied to the ballast
system of a semisubmersible drilling rig from a risk analysis point of view.
The final part of the literature survey is based on reports following the Deepwater Horizon acci-
dent in 2010. As a response to the accident, the independent research organization SINTEF and
the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) issued two separate reports, Tinmannsvik et al.
(2011) and Askedal et al. (2011), to highlight lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon acci-
dent and other major accidents in the petroleum industry. The two reports provide recommen-
dations to the industry as a part of a continuous improvement effort, and present several im-
portant findings related to stability, floatability and ballast systems on offshore facilities where
improvements should be made.
Chapter 2
Regulations and Standards
On the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) is
the regulatory authority for technical and operational safety. Any floating facility conducting
petroleum activities on the NCS, including FPSO vessels, must comply to the rules and regula-
tions of the PSA in all phases of operation. An important part of the documentation of compli-
ance to these rules and regulations is the Acknowledgement of Compliance (AoC), issued by the
PSA.
The AoC is a decision by the PSA that express the authorities´ confidence that petroleum activ-
ities can be carried out using the floating facility within the framework of the regulations (PSA,
2011). The AoC will be issued on the basis of PSAs own assessment of the condition of the fa-
cility, measured against the rules and regulations applying to the use of mobile facilities on the
NCS at the time of the AoC. The practice of the AoC ensures that any floating facility operating
on the NCS, is compliant to the rules and regulations of the PSA, regardless of flag or class. For
FPSO vessels, holding an AoC has been mandatory since July 1st, 2006 (PSA, 2011).
Ballast systems and stability are regulated in two overlapping ways in the PSA regulations. The
PSA Facilities Regulations explicitly regulate ballast systems and stability through section 39 and
section 62, where refererence is made to the rules and requirements issued by the Norwegian
Maritime Authority (NMA). In addition, the ballasting function performed by the ballast system
on a floating facility is classified by the PSA as a safety function, subject to additional regula-
tions.
In the following, the main regulations regarding ballast systems and stability from the PSA and
NMA are presented, followed by a presentation of relevant regulations and requirements con-
serning reliability assessments of ballast systems. Where reference is made to the Norwegian
Maritime Directorate, this is the former name of the NMA, as of January 1st. 2012.
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2.0.1 PSA Regulations
The PSA Facilities Regulations regulate ballast systems and stability for floating facilities explic-
itly in section 39 and section 62.
Section 39 Ballast system
Floating facilities shall be equipped with a system that can ballast any ballast tank under normal
operational conditions. In the event of unintended flooding of any space adjacent to the sea, it
shall nevertheless be possible to ballast. Ballast systems shall be in accordance with Section 2
and Sections 7 through 22 of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s Regulations relating to ballast
systems on mobile facilities (in Norwegian only).
The regulation referred to is NMA Regulation No. 879, presented in Section 2.0.2.
Section 62 Stability
Floating facilities shall be in accordance with the requirements in Sections 8 through 51 of the
Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s Regulations relating to stability, watertight subdivision and
watertight/weathertight closing mechanisms on mobile offshore facilities (in Norwegian only).
There shall be weight control systems on floating facilities, which ensure that the weight, weight
distribution and centre of gravity are within the design specifications. Equipment and structure
sections shall be secured against displacement that can influence stability.
The regulation referred to is NMA Regulation No. 878, presented in Section 2.0.2.
In the PSA Guideline regarding the facilities regulations, section 3, ballasting for floating facilities
is defined as a safety function. The Facilities Regulations, section 8, state that performance
requirements shall be stipulated for safety functions.
Section 8 Safety functions
Facilities shall be equipped with necessary safety functions that can at all times a) detect abnor-
mal conditions, b) prevent abnormal conditions from developing into hazard and accident situ-
ations, c) limit the damage caused by accidents. Requirements shall be stipulated for the perfor-
mance of safety functions. The status of safety functions shall be available in the central control
room.
2.0.2 NMA Regulations
The main regulations of the NMA regarding ballast systems and stability are
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• Regulation 20 December 1991 No. 879 conserning ballast systems on mobile offshore
units
• Regulation 20 December 1991 No. 878 concerning stability, watertight subdivision and
watertight/weathertight closing means on mobile offshore units
2.0.3 Reliability Assessment Requirements
The PSA and NMA regulations require that the ballast system is capable of performing its func-
tion, and indirectly presents reliability assessment as a means of verification.
In the NMA regulations, the following references to reliability assessments are made
• Regulation 20 December 1991 No. 879 conserning ballast systems on mobile offshore
units
– § 8: Requirements for risk analysis: An analysis shall be carried out to verify the ability
of the ballast system to function in accordance with the provisions of these regulations
– The analysis may be a risk/reliability analysis (Vinnem et al., 2006)
• Regulation 20 December 1991 No. 878 concerning stability, watertight subdivision and
watertight/weathertight closing means on mobile offshore units
– § 5: Documentation: The company shall be able to document compliance with the
requirements of these regulations.
– This may be a risk/reliability analysis (Vinnem et al., 2006)
• Regulation 22 December 1993 No. 1239 concerning risk analysis for mobile offshore units
– § 15: Reliability/vulnerability analysis: In the risk analysis the company shall incor-
porate a reliability/vulnerability analysis from every vendor of vital operating systems
and safety and emergency systems. The result of the reliability/vulnerability analysis
shall be incorporated into and taken into account in the design analysis and construc-
tion analysis.
The PSA regulations introduce reliability assessments of the ballast system through the perfor-
mance requirements of safety functions. In the PSA Guideline regarding the facilities regulations,
Re Section 8, the following applies to safety functions, including the ballasting function:
For design of safety functions as mentioned in the first subsection, the standards NS-EN ISO 13793,
NORSOK S-001 and IEC 61508 and OLF guideline No. 070 should be used.
CHAPTER 2. REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 10
In order to stipulate the performance for the safety functions as mentioned in the second subsec-
tion, the IEC 61508 standard and OLF Guideline No. 070 should be used where electrical, elec-
tronic and programmable electronic systems are used in the structure of the functions.
The reference made to the IEC 61508 (2010) standard, and the OLF070 (2004) guideline is im-
portant. These documents will be presented in the next section, and are used throughout the
thesis.
IEC 61508 Standard
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard is the main international standard for developing safety require-
ments to electrical, electronic and programmable electronic safety related systems, also known
as Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). SISs are safety systems comprising one or more input el-
ements, one or more logic solvers and and one or more actuating units. The main parts of a SIS
are illustrated in Figure 2.1, adopted from Lundteigen and Rausand (2007)
and maintenance, and environmental stresses outside the
design envelope.
Many authors find it useful to split CCF causes into root
causes and coupling factors (Parry, 1991; Paula, Campbell,
& Rasmuson, 1991). A root cause is a basic cause of a
component failure (e.g., a corrosive environment), while a
coupling factor explains why several components are
affected by the same root cause (e.g., inadequate material
selection for several valves).
The nuclear industry is very concerned with CCFs, and is
recording and analyzing CCF events (NUREG/CR-5460,
1990; NUREG/CR-5485, 1998; NEA, 2004, 2002, 2003,
2004). Several guidelines have been developed for qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis of CCFs. The Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) has initiated the International
Common Cause Data Exchange (ICDE) project to
encourage collection and analysis of data related to CCF
events. Several analyses of CCF data that give insight into
why CCFs occur have been published.
The oil and gas industry is mainly focusing on CCFs in
the design phase of the SIS, while CCFs are given much less
attention in the operational phase. The oil companies have
systematically collected reliability data for more than 25
years through the OREDA project (Langseth, Haugen, &
Sandtorv, 1998; Sandtorv, Hokstad, & Thompson, 1996).
The data collection is based on maintenance reports from
single item failures. This approach does not easily provide
information about CCFs and the status related to CCFs is
therefore not fully known. The Norwegian Petroleum
Safety Authority (PSA) is, however, increasingly concerned
with how new technology, standardization, and new
operational concepts may reduce the independence be-
tween SIFs (Hauge et al., 2006).
Function testing and inspection are key activities for a
SIS operating in the low demand mode. Low demand
means that the SIS experiences few demands, typically less
than once every year. Function testing and inspection are
influencing the occurrence of CCFs in the operational
phase because: (i) main types of CCFs can be identified and
corrected through efficient testing and inspection proce-
dures, and (ii) inadequate procedures and human errors
may cause simultaneous failures of several components
(Hirschberg, 1991; Johanson et al., 2003; Pyy, Laakso, &
Reiman, 1997).
The objective of this paper is to propose a CCF defense
approach which is able to improve the awareness to CCFs,
prevent CCFs from being introduced during the execution
of function tests and inspections, identify CCFs and CCF
causes and select efficient defenses against future CCFs.
The CCF defense approach is designed to be integrated
with current practices related to execution and follow-up of
function testing and inspection in the oil and gas industry.
The CCF defense approach has been developed for SIS
applications in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, but
should be applicable also to other industry sectors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we describe how CCFs currently are handled in the
Norwegian oil and gas industry. Section 3 describes how
diagnostic testing, function testing, and visual inspections
may influence the occurrence of CCFs. In Section 4 we
clarify and discuss the definition of a CCF and indicate
how CCFs may be classified. The new CCF defense
approach is described in Section 5. We conclude in Section
6 with a brief discussion of the proposed approach and give
some recommendations for further work in Section 7.
2. The oil and gas industry’s approach to CCFs
Recent SIS applications for the Norwegian oil and gas
industry are built according to IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC
61511 (2003). The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
(OLF) has developed a guideline on the practical applica-
tion of IEC 61508 (1998) and IEC 61511 (2003) in the oil
and gas industry, that is referred to as the OLF-070 (OLF-
070, 2004) guideline. The standards and the guideline
require that the effect of CCFs is taken into account in
reliability calculations. IEC 61508 (1998) recommends
using the b-factor model (e.g., see Rausand & Høyland,
2004), where b is the conditional probability of a CCF,
when a failure has occurred. An extended version of the
b-factor model, called the PDS method (Sintef, 2006), is
frequently used in the Norwegian oil and gas industry.
The IEC standards have few specific requirements
related to CCFs in the operational phase, and this may
be a reason why CCFs are not given much attention in this
phase. Another reason may be that there is a general lack
of knowledge on how CCFs affect operation and main-
tenance, since CCFs are not recorded and analyzed. There
is no guidance in OREDA (2002) on how to collect data on
CCFs, even though CCFs are mentioned in connection
with fire and gas detectors. ISO 14224 (2006) recognizes the
importance of sector specific CCF data for SIL analysis,
and suggests that CCF data are derived from analysis of
single failures rather than being recorded directly. Cur-
rently, however, data related to CCFs are not collected.
IEC 61508 (1998), part 6, Humphreys (1987), and Smith
and Simpson (2005) provide checklists that can be used to
determine an application specific b value, while the PDS
method suggests generic b values for various SIS compo-
nents. The generic values are based on previous estimates
combined with expert judgments, and may not reflect the
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Figure 2.1: Main elements of a SIS
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard is a generic, performance based standard that outlines how the
functional safety of a SIS should be managed, and provides guidance to the process of validation
and verification of such systems. The standard is used extensively throughout the oil and gas
industry, together with the application specific standard for SISs in the process industry; the
IEC 61511 (2004) standard. In Section 3.3, the process of developing reliability requirements
based on the IEC 61508 (2010) standard will be presented and discussed.
OLF 070 Guideline
The OLF070 (2004) guideline is a document developed to adapt and simplify the use of the
IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511 (2004) standards in the Norwegian petroleum industry. The
guideline was developed as a joint industry project between operators and suppliers of the in-
dustry, with the support of The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF).
The OLF070 (2004) guideline has become part of the recommended standard for specification,
design and operation of SISs on the NCS, and the document is closely linked to the safety func-
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tions defined in the PSA regulations. The guideline presents an alternative approach to the
IEC 61508 (2010) process of establishing reliability requirements to safety functions, and eval-
uates ballast systems explicitly as part of this approach. With regards to the quantification of
reliability of safety functions, the guideline recommends the use of the PDS method (Hauge
et al., 2009b). The PDS method is a reliability prediction method for SISs, in line with the main
principles of the IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511 (2004) standards. In Section 3.3, the process of
developing reliability requirements based on the OLF070 (2004) guideline will be presented and
discussed.
Chapter 3
FPSO Ballast System and Functions
3.1 Ballast System and Functions
3.1.1 Ballast System
All shipshaped floating production vessels are equipped with a ballast system, which is used
to maintain draft, stability and to keep the sheerforces and bending moments in the hull within
required limits. The ballast system performs these important functions by performing ballasting
and deballasting operations, whereby water is added or removed to different sections of the hull.
A typical ballast system consist of the following subsystems:
• Ballast tank configuration, pumps and valves
• Electric power system
• Hydraulic power system
• Ballast control system
In the following, a base case ballast system is described. The system is described at a level of
detail that provides a foundation for reliability assessments of different FPSO designs. The base
case vessel is a double sided and double bottomed ship shaped FPSO.
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Ballast Tank Configuration, Pumps and Valves
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Portside ballast tanks
Starbord ballast tanks
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with valves and pumps
Seachests
From
sea
To
sea
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sea
Figure 3.1: Sketch of the ballast system
Ballast Tank Configuration
The main ballast tanks are located on the port and starbord sides of the vessel, on each side of
the cargo tanks. The number of cargo and ballast tanks are usually determined based on the
production capacity of the FPSO and whether a shuttle tanker will be moored to offload the
produced oil. On the base case vessel, there are five main ballast tanks on each side.
The ballast tanks are connected to a ringmain line which transports ballast water between the
tanks and the pump room. Ballast valves control the flow of water between the individual tanks
and the ringmain line.
Through the ringmain line and pump room arrangement, ballast water can be transported be-
tween the port side and the sea, the starboard side and the sea, as well as internally between the
portside and starbord ballast tanks.
Additional ballast tanks may be located in the aft and foreward sections of the vessel, and are
used to manipulate the trim of the vessel. Ballasting for aft trim is performed to improve in-
herent heading control and weathervaning, and to facilitate process pipe drainage and effective
unloading of main ballast tanks. If the FPSO is equipped with an advanced turret system, an
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additional turret ballast system may be present. These additional ballast tank systems are not
included in the base case ballast system.
Ballast Valves
The ballast valves are hydraulically operated butterfly valves, that fail to a closed position. The
valves are normally closed, and are opened and kept open by hydraulic pressure acting through
a fail safe solenoid valve. The solenoid valve is normally closed, and is opened by electric signal
from the ballast control system. If the operator decides to close the valve or electric power is
lost, the electric signal will stop, and the solenoid will automatically return to a closed position,
closing the ballast valve. If hydraulic power is lost, the valve will return to closed position. A
position feedback signal is continuously sent from the actuator to the ballast control system. In
case of loss of position signal, the ballast control system will indicate a faulty signal, and close
the valve. Figure 3.2 present such a valve.
Hydraulic
Power
Ballast control 
logic + I/O
Position monitoring
Electric signal
Butterfly valve
Solenoid valve
Actuator
Figure 3.2: Hydraulically operated butterfly valve
Pump room
The pump room consists of a network of pipes, pumps and pump room valves that can be
brought to different configurations based on the planned ballasting operation. The ballast pumps
are electric centrifugal pumps operating in one direction only. In order to switch between bal-
lasting and deballasting operations, the water is routed around the pumps accordingly.
In the base case pump room configuration, three pumps are installed in a redundant setup,
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whereby any pump can perform any ballasting operation on its own. The pumps are normally
de-energized, and fail to a de-energized state. The pump room valves are hydraulically operated
butterfly valves, controlled by electric signal from the ballast control system. The valves are nor-
mally closed, and are fail-to-set valves. This means that the valves do not move to a predefined
position automatically upon loss of signal, but remain in the last known position. The valve is
similar to the valve presented in Figure 3.2.
Seachest/Discharge System
The seachest/discharge system is used when performing ballasting or deballasting operations
to sea. Two seachests are located below the waterline on each side of the vessel, providing pri-
mary intake of seawater for ballasting operations. The seachests are equipped with hydraulically
operated valves controlled by electric signal from the ballast control system. The valves are nor-
mally closed, and fail to a closed position. The valves are similar to the valve presented in Figure
3.2.
The discharge system consist of two pipes to sea, installed above the water line on each side
of the vessel. The discharge pipes are equipped with hydraulically operated ballast valves con-
trolled by electric signal from the ballast control system. The valves are normally closed and fail
to a closed position. The valves are similar to the valve presented in Figure 3.2.
Electrical Power System
The electric power system consists of the main power system, the emergency backup generator
and the Uninterruptible Power Sources (UPS).
Electric power is used to power the ballast control stations, pumps, the hydraulic power system
and to signal and receive position feedback from all the valves in the ballast system.
The main electric power system is operating continuously. In case of loss of main electric power,
UPSs will immidiately provide emergency power to the ballast control stations and operator
screens. Next, the emergency backup generator will turn on automatically. The emergency
backup generator provides a fraction of the main electric power, but enough power to operate
the ballast system.
Hydraulic Power System
The hydraulic power system consists of the main hydraulic power generator and a hydraulic
accumulator.
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Hydraulic power is used to operate all the ballast system valves. In order to ensure consistent
hydraulic pressure, the hydraulic power system is continuously energized and pressurized. In
case of loss of electric power, or failure of the main hydraulic power generator, the hydraulic ac-
cumulator will automatically provide sufficient hydraulic pressure to operate the ballast valves
for some time.
Ballast Control System
The ballast control system consists of the ballast control logic.
The ballast system is remotely controlled by an operator from a control station on the bridge
and/or from a designated ballast control room. From the control station, the various compo-
nents of the ballast system are activated through a control panel. The ballast control logic trans-
lates the operator commands and the feedback from the valves and pumps into electric signals,
activating the valve solenoids and ballast pumps accordingly.
The ballast operator will use various sources of information for decision support during bal-
lasting operations. The main sources of information are the calculations performed by the load
calculator, the information from level transmitters in cargo and ballast tanks and visual and
physical perception of the inclination and draft of the vessel.
3.1.2 Ballast System Functions
In the following section the main ballast system function is presented and split into safety func-
tions and non-safety related functions, providing a foundation for classification of the system.
The main function of the ballast system as presented in Petrojarl (2011a):
The ballast system is used to maintain sufficient draft, stability and to keep the bending moments
and sheerforces within required limits
Safety Functions:
• Maintain stability and draft of the vessel.
Non-Safety Related Functions:
• Keep the bending moments within required limits.
• Keep the sheerforces within required limits.
These non-safety related functions are mentioned briefly in Section 3.1.4, but are otherwise not
included. They are defined as non-safety related functions as the lack of these functions would
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cause unnecessary stress to the hull of the vessel, but not loss of stability or draft and immidiate
danger of a hazardous situation.
3.1.3 Ballast System as a Safety Barrier
According to Sklet (2006), safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means planned to
prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. Depending on when the ballast
system is operated, it can prevent, control or mitigate unacceptable inclination and draft of the
vessel, by ballasting or deballasting the hull. The ballast system can be regarded as a:
• Safety barrier against unacceptable inclination and draft
The ballast system is the second safety barrier against unacceptable inclination. The primary
safety barrier against unacceptable inclination is the inherent stability and draft of the vessel
design. The ballast system should furthermore be regarded as a barrier system. A barrier system
is a system that has been designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier functions.
A barrier function is defined as (Sklet, 2006)
• Barrier function: A barrier function is a function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate
undesired events or accidents
If the barrier system is functioning, the barrier function is performed (Sklet, 2006). In order
to assess the full functionality of the ballast barrier system, the following barrier functions are
proposed:
• Barrier function 1: To ballast/deballast starbord ballast tank system in response to oper-
ator command (BF1)
• Barrier function 2: To ballast/deballast portside ballast tank system in response to oper-
ator command (BF2)
• Barrier function 3: To ballast/deballast between starbord and portside ballast tank sys-
tem in response to operator command (BF3)
• Barrier function 4: Emergency stop of ballast system operation in response to operator
command (BF4)
By combining ballasting and deballasting operations in the barrier function description in BF1,
BF2 and BF2, the similarities between the two operations are taken into account, minimizing
the number of individual barrier functions. The two operations have the opposite effect on the
vessel, but utilize almost all the same components. The only difference is the routing of the wa-
ter in the pump room, and the switch between using the seachest or discharge configuration to
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carry out the function. The reduced number of barrier functions simplify the reliability assess-
ment of the safety barrier. BF4 is included as a part of the barrier system, due to the fact that if
an intended ballasting operation gets out of control, the ballast system will actually create un-
acceptable inclination and draft. Having the possibility to stop an ongoing ballast operation is
therefore an important barrier function.
3.1.4 Ballast System Operational Situations
The ballast system functions are used in two operational situations:
1. Upon a hazardous event/situation
2. Normal operations
Upon a hazardous event/situation, any ongoing ballast operations is stopped, and the opera-
tor perform new ballasting operations to mitigate the occurence of an undesired event. This
operational situation will be intense and demanding, and rely on the operators ability to make
fast decisions and perform the correct operations. During this operational situation, the ballast
system perform safety barrier functions.
During normal operations the ballast system is used to perform non-safety related functions.
During production of crude, the FPSO alternates between a fully loaded state and an empty
state right after offloading to a shuttle tanker. Throughout these states, ballasting operations
are performed with regular intervals each day to maintain the draft and stability of the vessel,
and to keep the bending moments and sheerforces within required limits. These operations
are part of the daily production routine, and are not conducted as a response to a hazardous
event/situation.
3.1.5 Safety Barrier Classification
Safety barriers may be classified as either active or passive, and as physical/technical or hu-
man/operational, according to the classification by Sklet (2006), presented in Figure 3.3. An
active barrier is defined by Sklet (2006) as:
A barrier that is dependent on the actions of an operator, a control system, and/or some energy
sources to perform its function.
The ballast system performs its barrier functions upon demand from an operator by the means
of electronic and hydraulic energy sources controlled by a specialized control system, and can
be classified as an active, physical/technical barrier.
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Safety barriers may also be classified on several other
ways. The classification illustrated in Fig. 5 may not always
be best suitable for the purpose of the classification. Then,
some other lines of classification described in Section 3 can
be used.
4. Performance of safety barriers
4.1. Performance criteria
To identify failed, missing, or functioning barriers is an
important part of a MTO-analysis (Rollenhagen, 1997),
and DoE (1999) addresses the following topics regarding
analysis of barriers in an accident investigation:
! Barriers that were in place and how they performed.
! Barriers that were in place but not used.
! Barriers that were not in place but were required.
The assessment of barrier performance is manageable in
accident investigations where a specific event sequence
already has occurred (Sklet, 2004). The situation is
somewhat different in proactive risk analyses. There are
several accident scenarios to analyse, and the analyses of
expected barrier performance are a vital part of the
risk analyses. As mentioned in Section 1, there are
distinctions regarding to which extent barriers should
influence the energy flow or event sequence, from ‘‘reduce
the probability’’, to ‘‘prevent the flow’’. This discussion
may be related to the discussion about the performance of
the barriers, and the subject is further delineated in this
section.
According to PSA (2002), performance of barriers, may,
inter alia, refer to capacity, reliability, availability, effi-
ciency, ability to withstand loads, integrity, and robustness.
Further, PSA writes in a letter to the oil companies (PSA/
RNNS, 2002) that the performance of safety barriers are
composed of three components; functionality/efficiency
(i.e., the effect the barriers has on the event sequence if it
functions according to the design intent), availability/
reliability (i.e., the ability to function on demand), and
robustness (i.e., the ability to function during accident
sequences or under influence of given accident loads).
Neogy et al. (1996) use the terms reliability and
effectiveness in order to describe how successful barriers
are in providing protection. They state that the reliability
of barriers is related to the ability to resist failures, while
the effectiveness of a barrier is related to how suitable or
how comprehensive the barrier is in protecting against a
particular hazard.
Table 2 shows a summary presented by Hollnagel (2004)
of a discussion of requirements of barrier quality made by
Taylor (1988).
In another paper, Hollnagel (1995) presents a set of
pragmatic criteria that address various aspects of barrier
quality:
! Efficiency or adequacy: how efficient the barrier is
expected to be in achieving its purpose.
! Resources required: the resources needed to implement
and maintain the barrier rather than the resources
needed to use it.
! Robustness (reliability): how reliable and resistant the
barrier is, i.e., how well it can withstand the variability
of the environment.
! Delay in implementation: the time from conception to
implementation of a barrier.
! Applicability to safety critical tasks: Safety critical tasks
play a special role in socio-technical systems. On the one
hand they are the occasions where specific barriers may
be mostly needed; on the other hand they are usually
subject to a number of restrictions from either manage-
ment or regulatory bodies.
! Availability: whether the barrier can fulfil its purpose
when it is needed.
! Evaluation: to determine whether a barrier works as
expected and to ensure that it is available when needed.
The evaluation can be considered with regard to how
easy it is to carry out and in terms of whether suitable
methods are available.
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Figure 3.3: Classification of barriers
Active, technical barriers are further classified into the following three groups, in accordance
with IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511 (2004)
• Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)
– Safety systems comprising one or more input elements, one or more logic solvers
and and one or more actuating units.
• Other technology safety-related systems
– Active safety systems that do not have any integrated logic (Rausand, 2011), based
on technology other than electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic (Sklet,
2006).
• Exter al risk reduction facilities
– Measures to reduce or mitigate the risk that is separate and distinct from the SIS or
oth technology safety-related systems (Sklet, 2006).
Ballast systems should be classified as SIS, and the main parts of the ballast system SIS is pre-
sented in Figure 3.4. Upon demand, t e ballast operator will provide the ballast control system
with operator commands. Together with the feedback signals from the final elements, these are
the main input elements to the SIS. The feedback signals are position indication signals from
valves, activation signals from pumps. T e ballast control logic will translate the input elements
into electric signal based on the pre-programmed logic, and subsequently activate the final el-
ements. The final elements in the ballast system are the electric pumps and various ballast
ystem valves.
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Figure 3.4: Ballast systems as a SIS
Historically, ballast systems did not involve any integrated logic, and the operator would con-
trol the ballasting operations from hardware based control stations. By physically operating
switches, the final elements in the ballast system would be activated and deactivated directly.
According to the classification scheme above, ballast systems were Other technology safety-related
systems. With the introduction of integrated logic, ballast systems became Safety Instrumented
Systems, with new inherent hazards and reliability challenges. Despite this transition, ballast
systems are not regulated as SISs today. Throughout the rest of the report the ballast system will
be treated according to a SIS classification.
SISs are used to implement one of more safety instrumented functions (SIF). A SIF is defined by
Rausand (2011) as
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF): A barrier function that is implemented by a SIS and that is
intended to achieve or maintain a safe state of the EUC with respect to a specific deviation (process
demand). A SIS may consist of one or more SIFs.
The specific deviation or process demand should be regarded as the loss of stability and/or draft
due to a hazardous event. The SIFs of the ballast system correspond to the barrier functions
identified in Section 3.1.3. The SIFs are presented along with the defined success criteria for
each SIF, and an associated sketch of the components involved in carrying out the SIF.
• SIF 1: To ballast/deballast starbord ballast tank system in response to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the starbord ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
to sea in response to operator command. (2) The ballasting operation stops upon
operator command.
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Figure 3.5: Sketch of SIF1
• SIF 2: To ballast/deballast portside ballast tank system in response to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the portside ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
to sea in response to operator command. (2) The ballasting operation stops upon
operator command.
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Figure 3.6: Sketch of SIF2
• SIF 3: To ballast/deballast between starbord and portside ballast tank system in response
to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the portside ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
with one of the starbord ballast tanks in response to operator command. (2) The bal-
lasting operation stops upon operator command.
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Figure 3.7: Sketch of SIF3
• SIF 4: Emergency stop of ballast system operation in response to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) Any ongoing ballasting operation is stopped upon
operator command. (2) All active components return to safe state.
The type and amount of electrical components constituting an emergency shutdown will
vary significantly. A sketch of the components is therefore not presented.
Safe State of the FPSO
The ballast system is designed to bring the vessel into a safe state, by the use of the SIFs. The
IEC 61508 (2010) standard defines a safe state as
Safe state: the state of the Equipment Under Control (EUC) when safety is achieved.
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard does not provide any specific rules as to how the EUC and and its
boundaries should be defined (OLF070, 2004), but based on the definitions in the standard, the
OLF070 (2004) guideline has proposed that the EUC can be a piece of equipment, machinery,
part of an offshore installation, or the entire installation.
With regards to the ballast system, the EUC is the entire FPSO vessel. This definition excludes
any mooring, riser or offloading systems from the boundary of the EUC.
Defining the safe state of the EUC is not straightforward, as the vessel is in constant motion.
With reference to the definition of safe state, safety is achieved when the FPSO has acceptable
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inclination and draft. The limits for what is acceptable will vary, but the vessel must comply
to the stability requirements of the flag or class, and these limits will be part of the vessel doc-
umentation. Per definition, as long as the vessel has a controlled inclination and draft within
acceptable limits, safety is achieved, and the EUC is in safe state. The following definition is
proposed:
• Safe state of the vessel is the controlled state in which the vessel has acceptable inclination
and draft
This is the safe state of the FPSO, but it can not be translated directly into a requirement for
fail safe design of the ballast system, because the ballast system has the capability of bringing
the EUC both in and out of the safe state, depending on the actions of the operator. The same
applies to any ballasting operation which is out of control. As such, the ballast system will not
be able to automatically bring the EUC into safe state upon a ballast system failure.
The ballast system should be designed to fail to a state in which no escalation of a hazardous
event is possible. On a system level, this implies that the ballast system should seize to perform
any ballasting operations. On a component level, all components should fail to a state in which
no ballasting operation is possible. The NMA regulation No. 879, presented in Section 2.0.2,
define this state as the safe position of the system, where the valves are required to be closed and
ballast pumps stopped.
SIS Mode of Operation
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard differentiates between two modes of operation for SISs: low de-
mand mode of operation and high demand/continuous mode of operation. The classification
refer to the demand frequency of the SIS, and the boundary point between the modes is often
taken to be once per year (Rausand, 2011). If a demand occurs more often than once per year,
the SIS is operating in a high demand mode of operation. The classification of mode of operation
is important, as the reliability requirements to SISs are set according to the classification.
Ballast systems on FPSOs are used extensively throughout the year. Ballasting operations are
conducted daily, and the system is in high demand, but these operations are conducted as part
of the daily production routine. When a ballast system SIF is used to respond to a loss of stability
and/or draft due to a hazardous event, this can be looked upon as an on demand situation,
related to systems in low demand mode of operation. In the OLF070 (2004) guideline, the low
demand mode of operation is referred to as a demand mode of operation. The ballast system is
hereby classified as a on demand system operating in a low demand mode of operation.
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3.1.6 Hazard Analysis
A HAZID is carried out to identify hazards that can lead to loss of stability and draft of the vessel.
The result of the HAZID is presented in Figure 3.8. The identified hazards are categorized into
the following hazard categories:
• External: hazards originating from external forces acting on the vessel
• Internal: hazards originating from possible internal fault conditions in the ballast system,
or during ballasting operations
• Human error: hazards originating from maloperation of the ballast system or vessel equip-
ment
The hazards are ranked according to frequency and consequence based on a coarse evaluation
of the hazard. The corresponding risk priority number (RPN) is the sum of the two ranking
categories, ranging from 1 as the lowest, and 5 as the highest.
Limitations The HAZID was limited to identify only a selection of external hazards and hazards
due to human errors.
Results of the HAZID There are multiple hazards leading to loss of stability and draft of a vessel,
and although many of these hazards are rare, the consequences can be very high, and their
influence on the total risk of the EUC is substantial. The hazards originating from the internal
hazard category are especially important as these hazards can be practically eliminated by a
robust ballast system design.
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Figure 3.8: HAZID
Hazard-Barrier Matrix
Based on the barriers and SIFs identified in Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.1.5, and the hazards iden-
tified in Section 3.1.6, a hazard-barrier matrix is used to evaluate the adequacy of the barriers.
The main objectives of a hazard-barrier matrix are to (Rausand, 2011)
• Identify barriers that are (or should be) implemented as protection against a specified
hazard.
• Identify barriers that are able to protect against more than one hazard.
• Identify hazards for which protection is inadequate.
• Verify the adequacy of the existing barriers and indicate where improvements are needed.
Hazard Categories: The hazard categories are equivalent to the hazard categories defined in the
HAZID study in Section 3.1.6:
• External (hazards)
• Internal (hazards)
• Human error (hazards)
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Internal hazards are assessed individually, while human error hazards and external hazards are
assessed as groups of hazards.
Barrier Categories: Three barriers have been included in the matrix:
• Barrier 1: The inherent stability and draft of the vessel design
• Barrier 2: The ballast system
• Barrier 3: Other possible interventions
Results of the Hazard-Barrier Matrix
The hazard-barrier matrix present the critical importance of the emergency stop function of
SIF4, as the primary barrier against internal hazards. The inherent stability/draft of the vessel is
seen to be the only barrier able to protect against all the hazards. For external hazards and hu-
man error hazards, SIF1, SIF2 and SIF3 can be used in different combinations to regain stability
and draft of the vessel. Manual intervention against internal hazards is the physical override of
valves and pumps by the vessel crew.
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Figure 3.9: Hazard-barrier matrix
3.2 Safety Barrier Failure Analysis
In order to function properly, the components constituting the various SIFs of the ballast system
must be in proper condition and available on demand. This is not always so, and the ballast
system may fail to operate as desired when one of its SIFs fail due to random, systematic or
common cause failure. These failure causes are the main sources of system unavailability, and
during ballast system design, operation and reliability verification, it is important to understand
these types of failures and their influence on SIF performance.
In the following section the various failure causes and failure modes of the ballast system com-
ponents are classified. Subsequently, a failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is
carried out on the ballast system components.
CHAPTER 3. FPSO BALLAST SYSTEM AND FUNCTIONS 28
3.2.1 Failure Cause Classification
Random and Systematic Failures
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard differentiate between random hardware failures and systematic
failures, and based on this failure cause classification the PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b)
present a failure classification that provides a detailed classification of systematic failures. In the
PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b), random hardware failures are defined as failures resulting
from the natural degradation mechanisms of the component. Systematic failures are defined
as failures related to a particular cause other than natural degradation. These failures are due to
errors made during specification, design, operation and maintenance phases of the component
lifecycle.
In the PDS method classification (Hauge et al., 2009b), random hardware failures are consider to
be independent failures and are assumed not to result in CCF, while systematic failures are po-
tentially dependent failures which may lead to CCF. Due to the detailed breakdown of systematic
failures, the PDS failure cause taxonomy has been adopted. In the PDS method, systematic fail-
ures are split into
• Software faults: Programming faults introduced during software design, modification or
during updates. Ex: Ballast control logic programming fault.
• Design related failure: Failures introduced during the design phase of the equipment. Ex:
Ballast valve fails to close due to insufficient actuator force.
• Installation failure: Failures introduced during the last phases prior to operation, during
installation/commisioning. Ex: Ballast valve position sensor miscalibrated.
• Excessive stress failure: Failure due to stress beyond the design specification of the com-
ponent. Ex: Ballast pumps operated during high pressure gravity filling.
• Operational failure: Failures initiated by human errors during operation or maintenance/testing.
Ex: Ballast pumps operated dry.
Common Cause Failures
If two or more dependent failures occur simultaneously, this is referred to as a CCF, defined
as
Common cause failure (CCF): A dependent failure in which two or more component fault states
exist simultaneously, or within a short time interval, and are a direct result of a shared cause.
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The definition is adopted from Rausand (2011), originating from the nuclear industry. As CCFs
can lead to simultaneous failures of redundant components, SIFs and even different SIFs at the
same time, CCFs represent a serious threat to SIS reliability performance. Ballast systems are
susceptible to CCFs, and it is of critical importance to recognize the failure type and find ways
to reduce the influence of CCF in design and operation of ballast systems, and to include the
contribution from CCF in reliability verification calculations.
The CCF definition includes several of the attributes of CCFs, identified by Watson and Smith
(1980), adopted from Rausand (2011)
• The components affected are unable to perform as required.
• Multiple failures exist within (but not limited to) redundant configurations.
• The failures are a "first in line" type of failure, not the result of cascading failures.
• The failures occur within a defined critical time period
• The failures are due to a single underlying defect or physical phenomenon
• The effect of failures must lead to some major disabling of the system´s ability to perform
as required.
The emphasis on dependent failure in the definition is important, and explains why CCF causes
are often identical to the systematic failure causes. To clarify when dependent failures are de-
fined as CCF, the following attributes from Lundteigen and Rausand (2007) may be used as a
guideline: (1) the CCF event comprises multiple (complete) failures of two or more redundant
components or two or more SIFs due to a shared cause, (2) the multiple failures occur within
the same inspection or function test interval, (3) the CCF event leads to failure of a single SIF or
loss of several SIFs.
CCF failures reduce the effect of redundancy in SIS design, and the number of components fail-
ing at the same time is only limited to the severity of the common cause, and the strength of the
dependency between the components. It should be noted that a CCF may lead to just one com-
ponent failing, if the other components have not yet failed within the critical time period.
An important element of failure classification of CCF is to identify the basic causes of compo-
nent failure and the reason why several components are affected by the same basic cause. One
way to do this, is by splitting CCFs failure causes into to root causes and coupling factors. A root
cause of a failure is defined by Rausand (2011) as
Root cause: The root cause of a specified failure is the most basic cause that, if corrected, would
prevent recurrence of this and similar failures.
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A coupling factor is defined by Rausand (2011) as
Coupling factor: A property that makes multiple components susceptible to failure from a single
shared cause.
A CCF is always the result of a root cause and a coupling factor, and knowledge of root causes
and coupling factors among the components in a SIS will provide a basis for corrective actions
and defenses aimed at minimizing the influence of CCF on the system. In Section 5.3, a defence
approach against CCF in ballast systems is presented.
3.2.2 Failure Mode Classification
In IEC 61508 (2010), failure modes are split into Dangerous (D) and Safe (S) failures, based on
the effect the failure mode has on the function of the SIS, the SIS subsystem or the SIS element.
Dangerous failures "prevent the safety function from operating when required, or decreases the
probability that the safety function operates correctly when required"(IEC 61508, 2010), while Safe
failures "result in the spurious activation of the safety function to put the EUC (or part thereof)
into a safe state, or increases the probability of the spurious operation of the safety function into a
safe state." (IEC 61508, 2010)
Based on the definitions above, and the descriptions in Rausand (2011) the following classifica-
tion and subclassification is used:
• Dangerous (D). The SIS/SIS subsystem/SIS element does not fulfill its required safety-
related functions upon demand. These failures may be split further into:
– Dangerous Undetected (DU): Dangerous failures that prevent activation on demand
and are revealed only by testing or when a demand occurs.
– Dangerous Detected (DD): Dangerous failures that are detected immidiately when
they occur.
• Safe failure (S). The SIS/SIS subsystem/SIS element has a nondangerous failure. These
failures may be split further into:
– Safe Undetected (SU): Non-dangerous failures that are not detected by automatic
self-testing or incidentally by personnel.
– Safe Detected (SD): Non-dangerous failures that are detected by automatic self-testing
or incidentally by personnel.
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3.2.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
A FMECA is carried out to identify failure modes, failure causes and failure effects among the
main components of the ballast system. The main objective of the FMECA is to identify the
dangerous undetected (DU) failure modes of the ballast system components. The dangerous
undetected failure modes are hidden failures that will only be revealed by a real demand or a
function test. The final FMECA worksheets are presented in appendix Figure B.1. A description
of the method can be found in Rausand (2011) or the IEC 60812 (2006) standard.
System Breakdown
The FMECA is based on the system description from Section 3.1.1, and the system breakdown
presented in appendix Figure B.1. The system breakdown provides an overview of the relevant
components, but does not reflect the system functionality. The components included in the
FMECA analysis are:
Ballast tank configuration, ballast
valves and pumps
Ballast valves
Pumproom valves
Seachest valves
Discharge valves
Ballast pumps
Electric power system
Main electric power generator
Emergency backup generator
UPS
Hydraulic power system
Main hydraulic power generator
Hydraulic accumulator
Ballast control system
Ballast control logic
Table 3.1: Components subject to the FMEA
System Functions and Operational Modes
The components are analysis in accordance to how they function as part of the barrier functions
presented in Section 3.1.3. The operational modes are based on the typical modes of the specific
component. The failure modes are ranked according to frequency and consequence based on a
coarse evaluation. The corresponding risk priority number (RPN) is the sum of the two ranking
categories, ranging from 1 as the lowest, and 5 as the highest.
Assumptions and Limitations
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• During the FMECA analysis, it is assumed that only one component fails at a time.
• The identified failure causes should be regarded as examples, not the result of a full as-
sessment.
• Regarding detection of failure, failures are assumed to be either hidden or evident. Evident
failures are detected the moment they occur. Hidden failures are detected during testing
or during actual demand. Function testing or on-demand situations are assumed to be
the only methods for detecting errors.
• Only the main failure modes of the components have been analyzed.
3.3 Reliability Performance Requirements
The PSA requires that the IEC 61508 (2010) standard and the OLF070 (2004) guideline is used
when stipulating the performance of safety functions when electrical, electronic and programmable
electronic systems are inherent in the structure of the function. The IEC 61508 (2010) standard
and the OLF070 (2004) guideline determine reliability requirements in two different ways. In
the following the two approaches are presented and discussed, and the proposed reliability re-
quirements for ballast systems on FPSOs will be presented.
The IEC 61508 Approach for Setting Reliability Requirements
The IEC 61508 (2010) is based on a Safety Life Cycle concept, which represent the necassary steps
towards achieving functional safety for an EUC in a systematic way. Central to the safety life
cycle concept is the structured and thorough approach to hazard and risk analysis, and the ob-
jective of the process is to identify the risk associated with the EUC and the EUC control system.
If the risk is found to be above the upper level of tolerability, the standard requires that one or
more safety functions should be put in place to reduce the risk to a tolerable level. The con-
cept is illustrated in Figure 3.10, adopted from OLF070 (2004) based on the original figure from
IEC 61508 (2010) standard.
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1.2 Risk reduction, SIS and safety barriers
In most situations safety is achieved by using a combination of various safety-related systems, including SIS (e.g.
ESD and F&G), safety systems based on other technology (e.g. PSV, firewalls, drain system) and additional risk
reduction facilities (e.g. procedures and separation/distance.). Hence, an overall safety strategy must take into
consideration all the safety-related systems and measures in order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. This is
illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.
Risk reduction achieved by all safety-related systems
and external risk reduction facilities
Residual risk Acceptable risk
Initial risk
("EUC risk)
Required risk reduction Increasingrisk
Risk reduction from
Safety Instrumented
Systems (SIS)
Risk reduction from
external risk reduction
facilities
Actual risk reduction
Risk reduction from
other technology safety
related systems
Figure 1.1 Framework for risk reduction (based on figure A.1 in IEC 61508-5)
The frequently used term "safety barrier" can also be related to the above framework. A safety barrier is often
interpreted as a function which must be fulfilled in order to reduce the risk, and such a function can be implemented
in terms of different systems and elements, both technical and operational. E.g. the safety function "avoid ignition"
may be implemented in terms of "ignition source isolation" and "control of hot work permits".
Hence, safety barriers are used to reduce risk and safety barriers can comprise a number of barrier systems and
elements including instrumented safety systems (SIS) as well as other risk reducing systems and measures. In the
management regulations, § 2 (PSA, 2002) safety barriers are specifically described. PSA indicates that general
principles and strategies given in IEC 61508 can be applied to all safety systems, although the standard and this
document focus on instrumented safety systems. Such general principles and strategies include:
x principles for risk reduction (ref chapter 7)
x the overall lifecycle approach given in IEC 61508 (ref. chapter 2, figure 2.3)
x the nomination of a designated responsible person or job position (ref. chapter 5)
x the performance and follow-up of verification and validation activities (ref. chapter 6)
x follow-up during operation (ref. chapter 10)
It should be noted that this document only gives requirements to instrumented safety functions. These requirements
are generally not given on an “overall safety barrier level”, but rather on a level corresponding to barrier elements.
Hence, the connection between risk and hazard evaluation and the requirements to barriers is not explicitly covered in
this document. This connection should therefore be covered elsewhere, and in this regard the overall facility QRA is
an important tool. For a further discussion of the connection between the QRA, the EUC related risks and the use of
IEC 61508/61511 for implementation of SIS, please refer to appendix C.
Figure 3.10: Framwork for risk reduction in IEC 61508
The level of tolerable risk for an EUC will vary, and is often derived from
• Regulations and guidelines from regulatory authorities
• Industry sta dards
• Expert, industry or scientific advice
The safety function will then be assigned a safety integrity requirement, which will be a measure
of the risk reduction associated with the safety function. The IEC 61508 (2010) approach ensures
that all requir ments ar risk based, and that all ec sions shall be taken based on tolerability of
risk and in the effort of risk reduction.
The standard requires that the risk reduction achieved by the functi n should be quantifi d and
expressed as a safety integrity level (SIL), which will be the primary reliability requirement for
the safety functi n. Safety integrity level (SIL) is defined by Rausand (2011) as
Safety integrity level (SIL): the probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the
required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a specified period of time.
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard defines four discrete safety integrity levels, where each level cor-
responds to an interval in the average probability of failure on demand, PF Dav g , and the prob-
ability of a dangerous failure per hour, PF H , as shown in Figure 3.11, adopted from the OLF070
(2004) guideline.
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SIL 4 is the highest safety integrity level, and SIL 1 the lowest. The PF Dav g applies to SISs op-
erating in on demand/low demand mode of operation, and the PF H applies to SISs in high
demand mode of operation. For the rest of the thesis, PF D is the equivalent to PF Dav g .
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8.5 Requirements
8.5.1 SIL requirements
For safety functions implemented through SIS technology, there are three main types of requirements that all have to
be fulfilled in order to achieve a given SIL:
x A quantitative requirement, expressed as a probability of failure on demand (PFD) or alternatively as the
probability of a dangerous failure per hour, according to Table 8.1 below;
x A qualitative requirement, expressed in terms of architectural constraints on the subsystems constituting the
safety function, ref. Table 8.2 or 8.3 below;
x Requirements concerning which techniques and measures should be used to avoid and control systematic faults.
Below, these three types of requirements are briefly discussed.
Quantitative requirements
IEC 61508 applies both to systems operating ‘on demand’ as well as to systems operating continuously in order to
maintain a safe state. An example of a demand mode system would be the ESD system, whereas the process control
system for an unstable process like an exothermic reactor will represent a continuous mode system.
In Table 8.1 the relationship between the SIL and the required failure probability is shown.
Table 8.1 Safety integrity levels for safety functions operating on demand or in a
continuous demand mode from IEC 61508-1, Table 2 and 3)
Safety Integrity
Level
Demand Mode of Operation
(average probability of failure to
perform its design function on demand -
PFD)
Continuous / High Demand
Mode of Operation
(probability of a dangerous failure
per hour)
4 t 10-5 to < 10-4 t 10-9 to < 10-8
3 t 10-4 to < 10-3 t 10-8 to < 10-7
2 t 10-3 to < 10-2 t 10-7 to < 10-6
1 t 10-2 to < 10-1 t 10-6 to < 10-5
IEC 61508 requires that a quantitative analysis is performed in order to verify that the required failure probability can
be achieved for the safety function. Such analysis shall include random hardware failures, common cause failures,
and if relevant, failures of any data communication systems used to support the safety function (e.g. Field bus).
It should be noted that the SIL requirement applies to a complete function, i.e. the field sensor, the logic solver and
the final element. A separate component can be certified for a particular SIL application, but such a certificate
constitutes only part of the verification effort, since the required failure probability from Table 8.1 must be verified
for the complete function.
Architectural requirements
Architectural constraints on hardware safety integrity are given in terms of three parameters
x the hardware fault tolerance of the subsystem (HFT);
x the safe failure fraction (SFF), i.e. the fraction of failures which can be considered “safe” because they are
detected by diagnostic tests or do not cause loss of the safety function, ref. appendix D;
x whether the subsystem is of “A-type” or “B-type”. For type A subsystems all possible failure modes can be
determined for all constituent components, whereas for type B subsystems the behaviour under fault conditions
cannot be completely determined for at least one component (e.g. a logic solver).
For further details, reference is made to IEC 61508-2, sub clause 7.4. The architectural requirements for different
safety integrity levels are given in Table 8.2 and 8.3 below.
Figure 3.11: Safety integrity levels in IEC 61508
By using the “t p-down” EC 61508 (2010) approach, the btain d SIL requirement for each SIF
will be directly related to the total risk reduction needs of the EUC. For each SIS introduced
to protect the EUC, the initial EUC risk will be reduced towards the acceptable risk level. The
process of assigning SIL requirements to various SIFs based on the identified risk reduction goal
is called SIL allocation. A number of qualitative and quantitative methods for SIL allocation
exist and sever l are presented in IEC 61508 (2010), such as
• Layers of protection analysis (LOPA)
• Risk graph ethod
• Event tr e method
The OLF 070 Approach for Setting Reliability Requirements
The OLF070 (2004) guideline presents a different approach to setting reliability requirements
for safety systems than the risk based approach of the IEC 61508 (2010). The guideline make
use of the same reliability performance metric, the SIL concept, but rather than allocating the
requirements to the SIFs "top-down", a set of minimum SIL requirements have been established
for the most common safety functions, as defined by the PSA.
As presented in the guideline, the rationale behind predefining the SIL requirements is
• To ensure a minimum safety level
• To enhance standardisation across the industry
• To avoid time-consuming calculations and documentation for more or less standard safety
functions.
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The minimum SIL requirements have been developed by combining simplified loop diagrams
of the safety functions with reliability data based on industry experience. As such, if the reli-
ability experienced in the industry is low, the minimum SIL requirement can turn out low. To
cope with this issue, the guideline has stipulated the stricter performance requirement in cases
where the calculated requirement turn out between two reliability levels, and emphasises that
the requirements are minimum requirements.
In the guideline, the ballast system is defined as a safety system with two safety functions, with
individual SIL requirements. The minimum requirements are established based on two simpli-
fied loop diagrams, and a number of assumptions.
• OLF070 Subfunction 1: Start of ballast system for initiation of rig re-establishment
– SIL1 minimum requirement
• OLF070 Subfunction 2: Emergency stop of ballast system
– SIL2 minimum requirement
Proposed Reliability Performance Requirements
The proposed reliability requirements to FPSO ballast systems are based on the OLF 070 ap-
proach for setting reliability requirements. Although the risk based approach of the IEC 61508
(2010) standard may lead to an adequately strict requirement, the process of assigning reliabil-
ity performance targets for ballast systems based on the overall EUC risk is not preferred, for
several reasons:
• The level of detail of QRAs as they are performed today, make them less appropriate for
stating absolute criteria. (OLF070, 2004)
• The requirements should be absolute, and applicable to all FPSOs, regardless of the risk
profile of the vessel.
• By assigning requirements directly to the systems, a minimum safety level is achieved,
regadless of any modification to the vessel.
The minimum SIL requirement approach is therefore adopted as the most effective way to en-
sure adequate reliability performance of ballast system functions.
With regards to the specific SIL requirements proposed by the OLF070 (2004) guideline, these
are not adopted without a proper discussion.
As presented above, the SIL requirements are the result of calculations based on a combination
of simplified loop diagrams and reliability data from the industry. In addition to the data, a range
of assumptions are made with regards to the test interval of the various components.
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A review of the data used in the calculation in OLF070 (2004) showed that some of the data had
changed since the calculations were performed. More specifically, the failure rate data used to
represent the failure rate of the valves had actually reduced significantly. To verify if the SIL re-
quirements would have been stricter if the calculations where performed today, a series of case
calculations are performed on the OLF070 Subfunction 1: Start of ballast system for initiation of
rig re-establishment. The result of the calculations are presented in appendix Figure B.6. The
findings of the calculations are presented:
• Case1: The calculations are identical to the calculations in OLF070 (2004). The result is a
SIL1 minimum requirement.
• Case2: The calculations are performed based on the same assumptions as in Case1, but
with the new valve failure rates. The PFD of the function result in a SIL1 minimum re-
quirement.
• Case3: The calculations are performed based on the same assumptions as in Case1, but
with the new valve failure rates and a 2190h test interval instead of a 4380h from Case 1.
The PFD of the function result in a SIL1 minimum requirement.
• Case4: The calculations are performed based on the same assumptions as in Case1, but
with the new failure rates and a 730h test interval instead of a 4380h from Case 1. The PFD
of the function result in a SIL2 minimum requirement.
The main result of the calculations show that if the calculations were performed today with the
same assumptions, same test interval, but new failure rates (Case2), the resulting minimum SIL
requirement would turn out the same. If the calculations were performed today with the same
assumptions, new failure rates and a test interval for valves less than every sixth week (1011h)
as in Case4, the PFD of the function would correspond to a SIL 2 minimum requirement.
Since the ballast valves on a FPSO are used every day, one could argue that they are actually
"tested" all the time, but an important assumption when performing function tests are that the
valves are assumed to be as good as new when they have been function tested. To carry out such
a test, a more thorough test approach is conducted. Due to resource constraints, these function
tests are performed less frequently.
To conclude on the specific requirement of the OLF070 (2004), the requirements for OLF070
Subfunction 1: Start of ballast system for initiation of rig re-establishment could have been in-
creased to a SIL2 minimum requirement to ensure continuous improvement of reliability per-
formance of ballast system functions. On the other hand, as the guideline stress the fact that
these requirements are minimum requirements, the SIL1 performance requirement is found ad-
equate.
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For ship-shaped floating facilities, including FPSOs, the following reliability performance re-
quirements are proposed, based on the SIFs and the success criteria identified in Section 3.1.5:
Safety Instrumented Function Proposed minimum SIL requirement
SIF1 SIL1
SIF2 SIL1
SIF3 SIL1
SIF4 SIL2
Table 3.2: Proposed minimum SIL requirements to ballast system functions
The requirements for SIF1 and SIF2 are based on the calculations conducted in Case3, where
the minimum SIL requirement calculations from OLF070 (2004) are performed with new fail-
ure rates and a 2190h test interval. The requirement for SIF3 is based on the calculations from
Case5 in appendix Figure B.6. In Case5, minimum SIL requirement calculations are performed
according to the OLF070 (2004) approach, but based on 1oo3-voting for pumps, 2190h test in-
terval, and a tank valve+solenoid/pilot instead of a discharge valve+ solenoid/pilot to account
for the configuration necessary to carry out SIF3. The result is a PFD within the SIL1 interval.
The requirement for SIF3 is adopted from the OLF070 Subfunction 2: Emergency stop of ballast
system.
With regards to the OLF070 (2004) guideline, there should be different requirements to differ-
ent floating facilities. By assigning only one requirement, covering all facilities with a ballast
system, important differences between the systems are overlooked. An important function of
a ballast system on a shipshaped vessel is the possibility to ballast internally between the port-
and starbord side, presented through SIF3. This is an important function of a shipshaped ves-
sel´s ballast system, and should be given a unique reliability requirement as in the proposed
requirements. As a minimum, different requirements should be made to ship-shaped vessels
and semi-submersible rigs, to account for the differences in design.
Reliability Performance Achieved
According to IEC 61508 (2010), three main types of requirements have to be fulfilled in order to
claim that a specific SIF have the potential to actually achieve a given SIL upon system startup:
(OLF070, 2004)
• A quantitative analysis must verity that the required failure probability can be achieved
for the SIF.
• A qualitative requirement must be met, expressed in terms of architectural constraints on
the subsystem constituting the safety function.
• Requirements concerning which techniques and measures should be used to avoid and
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control systematic faults.
The requirements to the SIL achieved will not be looked further into. More information on the
subject can be found in the IEC 61508 (2010) standard and the OLF070 (2004) guideline.
Chapter 4
Incidents and Accidents
The following chapter presents the findings of the literature survey into the reported safety and
reliability challenges, incidents and accidents related to ballast systems. Incidents to both ships
and other floating facilities are presented. The major incidents and accidents are presented
below, and the minor incidents are summarized and presented in Appendix B.
Rather than reproducing a full description of the incidents and accidents, the incident descrip-
tions are primarily concerned with the specific findings related to the ballast systems.
The findings show that failures related to ballast system can have a severe impact on the chain
of events in an accident. The Ocean Ranger accident is one of the worst accidents ever in the off-
shore industry, and the investigations revealed the vulnerability of ballast control system failure.
Using reliability assessment terminology, the control system, indicators and operator panels on
the Ocean ranger were subject to a severe CCF, where the root cause was electric failure due to
water ingress, and the coupling factor between the different components was the same loca-
tion.
The Petrobras P-34 FPSO incident is highly relevant for the topic of the thesis. The incident rep-
resent a typical systematic software failure where the control logic of the ballast system lacked
the proper fail safe functionality upon valve position feedback failure. The incident stress the
importance of proper manual intervention and emergency plans in case of loss of control of the
ballast system, and the need for proper reliability assessments of ballast systems.
The Gjøa and Thunder Horse accidents represent systematic failures inherent in the design of
the ballast systems. Although the Gjøa platform was under modification work, the systematic
programming errors in the valve control systems had been made prior to installation. The same
applies to the hydraulic power unit installed on the Thunder Horse production facility.
The minor incidents present a series of spurious trip incidents, valve leakage failures and other
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incidents causing a range of problems in the daily operation.
4.1 Minor Incidents and Accidents
Minor incidents and accident where ballast systems have caused or contributed to unwanted
events are documented in a set of tables in Appendix B. The tables and their associated data
sources are presented in Table 4.1
Table 4.1: Overview of tables and datasources
Table Description Source
B.1 Stability incidents reported to the PSA (Source
1)
Vinnem et al. (2006)
B.2 Stability incidents reported to the PSA (Source
1)
Vinnem et al. (2006)
B.3 Stability incidents reported to HSE (UK) 1980-
2003 (Source 2)
Vinnem et al. (2006)
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4.2 Major Incidents and Accidents
Petrobras P-34
Date and time: 13.10.2002
Accident type and severity: Critical list of the FPSO due to ballast system failure. Potential
major accident. Evacuation.
Accident location: Barracuda field, Campos Basin Brazil
Description of system involved:
FPSO converted from a tanker. L.W.H: 240x26x17m. Displacement 62000tons. Storage capac-
ity: 58000m3. Production capacity: 45000 bopd. Owned and operated by Petrobras.
Context of accident: Weather was not a contributing factor to the event.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system:
The incident occured during maintenance of a battery charger. The electric circuits fed by
the particular battery charger became de-energized, among them the intrinsic safety panel
connecting the ballast and cargo control system with the electric position feedback from the
ballast and cargo valves. The main electric power generation shut down, and the hydraulic
power system, ECOS and PLC relay cards in the valve control system were de-energized.
Emergency backup generator started within 40 sec, PLC relay cards energized, ECOS starts
booting operating systems but remain down in 11min. The PLC receives no position feedback
from any valve (0mA). The PLC logic was not failsafe and started immidiate actions to open
all valves in order to reach the (4mA) electric feedback signal corresponding to a closed valve
(20mA=Open). All 66 ballast and cargo tanks were opened by hydraulic pressure available
in the hydraulic accumulators. Crude oil in the cargo tanks and ballast water in the ballast
tanks gravity drained to the portside tanks. The FPSO reached a critical 34 degree list before
control was regained and salvaging operations could begin. Crew were abandoned in lifeboats
throughout the incident. No injuries to personnel.
Source of information:
Tinmannsvik et al. (2011)
Petrobras (2002). Figure 4.1 adopted from Petrobras (2002)
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Listing description 
Tanks level after listing 
Popa BE 
BB 
Maximum level  
Bow Stern SB 
PS 
Figure 4.1: Petrobras P-34
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Ocean Ranger
Date and time: 15.02.1982
Accident type and severity: Major accident. Rig capesizing. Loss of all 84 crewmembers. Loss
of semisubmersible drilling rig.
Accident location: Canadian waters outside Newfoundland
Description of system involved:
Semisubmersible drilling rig owned by ODECO, drilling for Mobil Exploration. L.W.H:
121x80x103m. Weight: 25000tons. Designed for harsh weather operations.
Context of accident: An incoming storm had a direct effect on the accident. The rig was
preparing to abandon drilling operations and prepare for the storm when the accident oc-
curred. The rig had not yet been brought to safe draft.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system:
A large wave hit the Ocean Ranger as the rig was preparing for the storm. The wave broke
2 of the 4 portlights in the ballast control room located in a vulnerable position in a column
below the main deck. Water ingress through the portlights caused the ballast control station
to malfunction, and ballast valves to open and close in an uncontrolled way.
"As a direct or indirect result of the malfunction, several valves in the ballast control system
opened or were opened allowing seawater to enter the forward ballast tanks and/or on-board
ballast water to gravitate forward, either of which would have caused a substantial forward
list."(U.S. Coast Guard, 1983)
The combination of the electric malfunction, ineffective initial response from the ballast op-
erators and lack of training in emergency operation of the ballast control system caused the
Ocean Ranger to assume a forward list allowing the unprotected forward chain lockers to be
filled with seawater, causing increased list. The ballast system pump and piping design and ar-
rangement was inadequate for deballasting at excessive heel or trim angles under emergency
operating conditions. Efforts to abandon the rig was unsuccessful, and the rig eventually cape-
sized and sank. All 84 crewmembers died in the accident.
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Ocean Ranger
Accident description in relation to the ballast system: (Continued)
All the ballast valves on the Ocean Ranger, except two manually operated sea inlet gate valves
were pneumatically operated butterfly valves located in the ballast pump rooms and propul-
sion rooms of each pontoon. The valves were designed to fail to a closed position in case of an
electrical or air pressure failure. Investigations showed that the crew had attempted to manu-
ally operate the system by using brass control rods designed to manually operate the systems
air control solenoids, which in turn controlled the opening and closing of the ballast valves.
Since all valve indication lights were out, this was most likely done completely in the blind. It
normally took approximately 40 seconds to open a valve and 20 seconds to close a valve.
Another feature was the main electric power cut off installed inside the ballast control con-
sole. The cut off circuit breaker was not marked, and testimonies from former crewmembers
indicated that operators were unaware of the location of this circuit breaker.The investigations
of the accident confirmed that a series of mitigating actions could have been initiated by the
operators if they had been sufficiently trained to operate the ballast system in an emergency
situation.
Source of information:
Tinmannsvik et al. (2011)
U.S. Coast Guard (1983)
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Gjøa
Date and time: 03.03.2010
Accident type and severity: Minor stability incident, spurious trip of ballast system
Accident location: Dockside at Aker Stord Norway
Description of system involved: Semisubmersible drilling rig
Context of accident: No weather effects.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system:
The rig was under construction and outfitting when a power failure caused a number of con-
trol units to stop and restart. Due to a programming error in the ballast control logic, all the
ballast valves in a specific quadrant were spuriously opened, causing 700-900tons of ballast
water to migrate internally, causing a 3 degree list of the rig. The power failure also caused
a series of local failures where systems had to be manually restarted. The emergency shut-
down button for the ballast system had not yet been installed. Controlled evacuation of the
rig. Control of the situation after restarting systems.
Source of information: Tinmannsvik et al. (2011) Vinnem et al. (2006)
Aban Pearl
Date and time: 13.05.2010
Accident type and severity: Semisubmersible sinking
Accident location: Off the coast of Venezuela
Description of system involved: Semisubmersible gas production platform from 1977. Newly
refurbished.
Context of accident: No weather effects.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system: The floating devices on the rig started
to take in water during transit. The rig eventually sank. Probable cause is leakage, malopera-
tion or other error with the ballast system (Tinmannsvik et al., 2011).
Source of information: Tinmannsvik et al. (2011) Vinnem et al. (2006)
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Thunder Horse
Date and time: 08.07.2005
Accident type and severity: Severe and uncontrolled heel of floating production platform.
Accident location: US Gulf of Mexico
Description of system involved: Semisubmersible production platform.
Context of accident: The platform was under commisioning, and the incident happened dur-
ing evacuation before Hurrican Dennis.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system:
The rig had been evacuated due to the passage of Hurricane Dennis. When the crew returned
to the rig they found it listing 20 degrees with the top deck in the water on the port side. Find-
ings indicate that failures associated with the hydraulic control system and the isolation of the
system during evacuation led to the partial opening of multiple hydraulically operated valves
in the ballast and bilge systems of the vessel, allowing water migration to take place. The
ballast water migration led to the initial listing of around 16 degrees. The subsequent water
migration into manned spaces in the lower hull via faulty check valves in the integrated bal-
last and bilge system increased the degree of listing. Downflooding of seawater, and possible
wave action associated with the hurricane increasing the list up to 21 degrees. The platform
was restored.
Source of information: Tinmannsvik et al. (2011)
Jupiter
Date and time: 12.04.2011
Accident type and severity: Semisubmersible flotell partial sinking.
Accident location: Gulf of Mexico
Description of system involved: Semisubmersible flotell
Context of accident: Weather was not a contributing factor.
Accident description in relation to the ballast system:
The semisubmersible flotell started to take in large amounts of seawater through a faulty valve
in one of the pontoons. The 713 workers onboard were evacuated. The affected side eventually
sank to the bottom of the shallow water.
Source of information: Tinmannsvik et al. (2011)
Chapter 5
Reliability Assessment Approach for FPSO
Ballast Systems
In the following chapter, a stepwise reliability assessment approach for ballast systems is pre-
sented. The reliability assessment approach can be used to quantify the reliability performance
of the safety functions of a ballast system, and idenfify the contribution from CCFs on the re-
liability performance of these functions. The results of the assessment can be used as part of
a verification process of reliability performance, as decision support during the design phase
of new ballast systems or to quantify reliability enhancing efforts performed on an existing de-
sign.
In addition, a defence approach against CCFs in ballast systems is presented. The approach
can be used to improve the operators ability to identify and avoid the reoccurence of CCF in the
operational phase.
5.1 Background for the Approach
5.1.1 Selection of Reliability Modeling Approach
In order to verify compliance to reliability targets of SIFs, the IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511
(2004) standards suggest the use of FTA, Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) or Markov methods
to calculate reliability performance (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). FTA and RBD are methods
that model the system failures and functions in a static way, with binary states. The system
components and functions are assumed to be either available or not. With Markov methods, the
components may have more than one state, and Markov methods is preferred when modeling
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dynamic systems that are switching between different states. As the ballast system components
may be adequately modeled as either available or not, Markov methods are not included as part
of the modeling approach.
Both FTA and RBD are applicable methods for reliability modeling of the ballast system, and if
the models are established on the same basis, the two approaches will give the same result. The
FTA method is considered to be more comprehensive than the RBD method, due to the failure
oriented approach, and is often preferred for modeling complex SIFs with a large number of
components.
The RBD method provides a different approach to modeling. Rather than focusing on how a
function may fail, the approach focuses on how a function may be achieved, and the sequence
of reliability blocks in the RBD may be set up similar to the sequence the SIF is activated. This
is a benefit, as components can then be easily added and removed to the RBD when model-
ing different ballast system designs. Generic RBDs for the different SIFs can easily changed to
represent the ship specific configuration of a safety function. Identified CCF among redundant
components can easily be included in the RBD. Due to the flexibility of the RBD method, it is
found to be the most appropriate modeling approach for the ballast system reliability assess-
ment.
5.1.2 PFD Calculation
The quantitative reliability performance measure for a SIS operating in low demand mode of
operation is the average probability of failure on demand, PFDav g (PFD), which is only related
to DU-failures. The PFD can be calculated for individual items and complete systems as long as
the following basic assumptions hold:
• The item is subject to a regular functional test at test interval τ
• All hidden failures are revealed by the functional test and repaired immidiately.
• The time required to test and repair the item is considered to be negligible
• After a test/repair the item is "as good as new"
• The item is not subject to diagnostic self-testing
• The item is functioning as a safety barrier only if a DU failure mode is not present
For practical calculations of PFD, approximation formulaes are used. For detailed derivations
leading to these formulaes, see Rausand and Høyland (2004). The following approximation for-
mulaes can be used in the assessment:
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PFD Single Item:
For a single item, tested at regular intervals of length τ, with constant failure rate λDU with
respect to DU-failures, and where λDUτ is small, (i .e.< 10−2)(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009),
the following formula can be used:
PF D ≈ λDUτ
2
(5.1)
The approximation is conservative, which means that the approximated valve is greater than
the correct value obtained by detailed calculations.
PFD Parallel Items:
For two independent items of the same type operated as a 1oo2-system, tested simultaneously
at regular intervals of length τ, with constant failure rates λDU with respect to DU-failures, and
where λDUτ is small (i .e.< 10−2), the following formula can be used:
PF D ≈ 1
3
(λDUτ)
2 (5.2)
A 1oo2-system will only fail when both components fail. The probability Q(t) that the system is
in failed state at time t is
Q(t )= q1(t ) ·q2(t ) (5.3)
Where qi (t ) is the probability that component i is in failed state at time t, for i=1,2. This rela-
tionship is sometimes wrongfully interpreted in PFD software calculations, where PFD1oon is
calculated by
PF D1oon =Πn1 PF Dn (5.4)
The approximation does not give accurate results, and should not be used directly. The reason
it does not hold is because PFD is the average unavailability of the system, and the average of
a product is not the same as the product of averages. This is known as the Schwartz inequal-
ity.
Interestingly, 5.4 can be used successfully to calculate PFD of more complex 1oon-configurations
comprising different types of components if coupled with the correction factor presented in
Lundteigen and Rausand (2009):
CF1oon = 2
n
n+1 (5.5)
For complex 1oon-configurations that comprise different types of components, the approach
is as follows: (1) Calculate PFD of each redundant channel. (2) Calculate the non-conservative
PFD by using 5.4. (3) Reduce the non-conservative error by multiplying with the appropriate
correction factor from 5.5.
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PFD Series System:
For two independent items with individual constant failure rates λDU1 and λDU2 with respect
to DU-failures, tested simultaneously at regular intervals of length τ, where both items have to
function for the system to function, and where λDUiτ is small (i .e.< 10−2) for i=1,2., the follow-
ing formula can be used:
PF D ≈ (λDU1 +λDU2 )τ
2
= λDU1τ
2
+ λDU2τ
2
(5.6)
The approximation shows that for series systems, the PFD of a series system is approximately
the sum of the PFDs of the individual items (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
PFD koon-Systems:
For a system of independent components of the same type operated as a koon-system, tested
simultaneously at regular intervals of length τ, with constant failure rates λDU with respect to
DU-failures, and where λDUτ is small (i .e.< 10−2), the following formula can be used:
PF Dkoon ≈
(
n
n−k+1
)
(λDUτ)n−k+1
n−k+2 (5.7)
PFD of Components in Continuous Operation:
In order to calculate PFD of component in continuous operation, a simplification can be made.
These items are in continuous operation with occasional unexpected downtime. They are not
function tested or needed "on demand". The suggested approach for modeling these compo-
nents is presented through the main electric power system.
Consider the main electric power system as an item, which is either functioning or not. By
functioning, the item is in active operation, delivering electric power. By not functioning, the
item is unavailable due to any failure cause, as opposed to a planned shutdown. When the main
electric power is repaired, it is assumed to be "as good as new", with sufficient power.
The average unavailability of the item, A¯av , denotes the mean proportion of time the item is not
functioning (Rausand and Høyland, 2004)
A¯av = MT T R
MT T F +MT T R (5.8)
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Where MTTR (mean time to repair) denotes the mean downtime after a failure, and MTTF (mean
time to failure) denotes the mean functioning time of the item. MTTF may be written as
MT T F = 1
λ
(5.9)
Where λ denotes the failure rate of the item. Equation 5.8 becomes
A¯av = MT T R1
λ +MT T R
= λ ·MT T R
1+λ ·MT T R (5.10)
The second term in the denominator is negligible for practical calculations and the final term
becomes
PF D ≈ A¯av ≈ λ ·MT T R
1
≈λ ·MT T R (5.11)
Whereλdenotes how often the main electric power is not functioning due to an unexpected fail-
ure, and the MTTR is the time required to get the main electric power functioning again.
PFD of Human Interventions:
If any human interventions are necessary to successfully execute a ballasting function, the pos-
sible non-fulfilment of that task should be included in the PFD calculations. The planning and
initiation of the ballast functions should not be included in the calculations, only possible ex-
traordinary human interventions identified through the shipspecific ballast system familiariza-
tion.
As with structured Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods, some of the benefits of includ-
ing human errors during reliability modeling are that the process (Rausand, 2011): (1) Identifies
weaknesses in operator interfaces with the system (2) Demonstrates quantitative improvements
in human interfaces (3) Supports the development of preventive or mitigating measures to re-
duced the influence of human errors on the system reliability.
If sufficient data is available, the probability of a human error can be represented by the Human
Error Probability defined as
Human error probability (HEP): The probability that an error will occur when a given task is
performed.
Estimated by
HEP = number of errors
number of opportunities for error
Alternatively, the HEP may be based on expert judgement or by using tabulated values for hu-
man performance. The LOPA technique, presented in the IEC 61511 (2004) standard provide the
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suggested PFD values for operator intervention in Table 5.1, adopted from IEC 61511 (2004).
Protection layer PFD
Human performance (trained, no stress) 1,0×10−2 to 1,0×10−4
Human performance (under stress) 0,5 to 1,0
Operator response to alarms 1,0×10−1
Table 5.1: PFD of Human performance
5.1.3 Common Cause Failure Modeling
The IEC 61508 (2010) and IEC 61511 (2004) standards require that the effect of CCFs are included
in reliability performance calculations, and recommend the use of the β-factor model.
The β-factor model is the most commonly used model for CCF modeling, but it is not the only
option for modeling CCFs.
The model assigns a fraction, β of the failures of a component to be CCF, and assumes that
when a CCF occurs, all components in that component group will fail due to the same cause. In
a redundant setup, with n identical components in parallel, each with a constant failure rate λ,
this means that given a component failure, this failure will cause all the n other components to
fail with probability β, and involve only the single component with probability (1−β) (Rausand,
2011).
The implications of the simplicity of the β-factor model, is that the contribution from CCFs will
dominate the results of PFD calculations, regardless of voting configuration (Rausand, 2011).
This can be illustrated by an example:
Consider a system of 5 ballast tank valves configured as 1oo5-system, which is functioning as
long as at least one of the five channels is functioning. The critical failure rate of the valves is
estimated to λDU , and the valves have been found to be exposed to CCFs. The system is tested
at regular intervals of length τ, and one can assume that the testing is perfect and that the valves
are as good as new after each test.
The PFD is calculated by using 5.7 for a koon-system of identical and independent components,
with CCFs modeled by the β-factor model
PF D1oo5 ≈ ((1−β)λDUτ)
5
6
+ βλDUτ
2
(5.12)
The first term in the answer is the contribution from independent failures, while the last term is
from CCFs. The contribution from CCFs will by far outweigh the contribution from the indepen-
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dent failures, and this dominance will not be affected significantly by any change in voting. As
one may expect to have CCFs where not all the redundant components fail with probability β,
the β-factor model will be rather pessimistic for redundant systems with many channels.
This has been taken into consideration in the OLF070 guideline, which recommend the CCF
model developed as part of the PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b) when quantifying PFD. The
model argues that there should be different β factors for different voting configurations, and
presents a configuration factor, CMooN , which takes into account the specific voting configu-
ration. The result is a CCF modeling approach which is more sensitive to the specific voting
configuration in the reliability model. The modified β-factor of a system with MooN voting
configuration equals:
βMooN =CMooN ·β (5.13)
The numerical values for the CMooN factor can be extracted from figure 5.1, adopted from Hauge
and Onshus (2009). Note that for 1oo2 systems the C1oo2=1, resulting in β1oo2=β.
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APPENDIX B: The Configuration Factors, CMOON
This Appendix considers in some more detail the configuration factors, CMOON, related to the PDS
common cause factor model. First determination of specific values for he CMOON is discussed and
secondly general formulas for these factors are provided.
B.1 Determining Values for the Configuration Factors, CMOON
In previous versions of the PDS method- and data handbooks (e.g. /6/ and /17/), suggested values
of CMOON for s me typical voting configurations hav been given, s e Table B. 1.
There is of course no definite choice of the values for the CMOON values. It may also be argued that
the CMOON factors should differ for different types of equipment. Experience data on common
cause failures are in general scarce and data which explkitly differentiate between different
voting logics even scarcer. The factors therefore have to be chosen based on expert judgements
mainly. When determining the above suggested CMOON values, the following two assumptions
were made:
i. Given a failure of two similar redundant components, then the likelihood of having a
simultaneous failure of a third added component will be 0.3
ii. When having a common cause failure of three or more components, then the likelihood
of having a simultaneous failure of the next added component will be 0.5
There have been comments that the above factors are not sufficiently conservative and that the
effect of added redundancy (e.g. going from 2 to 3 components in parallel) may be somewhat
optimistic. These comments are partly supported by empiric results from a study made in Swedish
Power plants, /26/ and subsequent analysis of data from this study. This reference suggests the
following:
• Given a failure of two redundant components, the likelihood of having a simultaneous
failure of a third added component may be higher than 0.3, sometimes as high as 0.5.
• When introducing more and more components it appears that the effect of added
redundancy decreases as the number of components increases.
62 JSINTEF
Table A.3 IEC 61508 versus PDS notation
IEC notation PDS notation Description I comparison
LEC applies DC for the diagnostic coverage, i.e. the fraction of
DC failures detected by automatic self-test. In PDS the coverage factor cis defmed as the fraction of failures detected through self-test or
(incidentally) by operational personnel.
D =2DU +?DD Rate of dangerous (D) failures
Rate of dangerous undetected (DU) failures; i.e. rate of dangerous
XDU failures which lie outside the coverage of the diagnostic tests
Rate of dangerous detected (DD) failures; i.e. rate of dangerous
2DD failures which are detected by the diagnostic tests
2s = 2s + ?SD Rate of safe (S) failures (i.e. spurious trip type of failures)
Rate of safe undetected (SU) failures. In PDS this is interpreted as the
‘SU safe failures that actually cause a trip of the component
Rate of safe detected (SD) failures. In PDS this is interpreted as the
2SD safe failure that is detected such that a trip is avoided
Rate of dangerous undetected random hardware failures, i.e. the part
?‘DURH of2DU originating from random hardware failures (i.e. equals the 2DU
as defmed in IEC 61508)
Rate of dangerous undetected systematic failures, i.e. the part of2DUDU-SYST originating from systematic failures. Hence ?.DU = DU-RH + DU-SYST
The fraction of2DU originating from random hardware failures, r =
r 2DU-RH / ADU. 1-r will be the fraction of2DU originating from
systematic failures, i.e. 1- r =2DU-SYST / 2DU
Rate of non-critical failures, (neither dangerous nor spurious trip), i.e.
NONC safety function not directly affected
The fraction of failures of a single component that causes both
components of a redundant pair to fail “simultaneously”.
P In IEC it applies only for random hardware failures (! !), whereas in
PDS it applies also for systematic failures detectable by functional
testing or incidentally by an operator.
In IEC defined as the fraction that have a common cause of those
PD failures that are detected by the diagnostic tests (ref. IEC 61 508-6,
Table B.l)
Table B. 1 Previous suggested CMOONfactors for different voting logics, ref /6/and/i 7/
is used.
Observe thatC1002 = 1. Hence, for the loo2-voting the specified 13-value without any modificationFigure 5.1: Cmoon factors
The differenc between the methods an be illustr ted by applying the CMooN -factor approach
to the example presented above. For the 1oo5 system, the C1oo5 = 0,08, and the correctedβ1oo5 = 0,08 ·β
PF D1oo5 ≈ ((1−β1oo5)λDUτ)
5
6
+ β1oo5λDUτ
2
(5.14)
The result can be seen in the second term, corresponding to the contribution from CCF failures
on the system PFD. The hig redundancy in the 1oo5 voting has a ginalized the βMooN , whic
in turn results in a reduced contribution from CCF failures on the system PFD.
Due to this powerful characteristic, the CCF modeling from the PDS method has been chosen
as the preferred CCF modeling approach for the reliability assessment.
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Determining β
There are three main sources of β factors to common cause component groups
• Checklists
• Reliability databases
• Expert judgement
The IEC 61508 (2010) standard encourage the use of enclosed checklists to establish β factors
based on the specific condition of the installation. The OLF070 (2004) guideline recommends
the use of a genericβ factor based on operational experience documented in reliability databases,
and refer to β factors from the PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b).
For initial calculations, applicable tabulatedβ factors from the PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b)
can be used. In Figure 5.3, theβ factors are presented in connection with the proposed reliability
data.
If efforts are made to reduce the influence of CCFs on a later stage, the result of the efforts can
be quantified into the β factor, by using the Active protection application specific β approach
developed for the PDS method (Hauge et al., 2009b). The idea behind the approach is to multiply
the generic β with a parameter kβ, which can be chosen based on an assessment of the systems
protection against CCFs. The numerical values for kβ can be extracted from Figure 5.2, adopted
from the PDS handbook (Hauge et al., 2009b).
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The application specific failure rate for systematic failures in ESVs is calculated as
?DU.SYsT* = DU-SYST (wi rc3 ris + W2 r2G r2s + W3 r3G r3s)
= 1.1 106 (005 + 0.007 + 0.2)
= 2.8 failures per hour
Thus, the updated2’DU, which we will denote ?Du*, is given by
DU* = ?DUR}I + DU.SYST*
=1.0.10.6+2.8. lO
= 1.3 10.6 failures per hour
Comment
The method presented here for calculation of application specific ?DUSYST is not based on a
complete list of measures affecting Du-SYST and neither is the effect of each measure stated.
Rather, it is up to the manufacturer and user of the SIS equipment to document the measures they
have implemented and argue for the degree to which these measures reduce the average rate of
systematic failures for each failure cause category.
Specific measures to reduce the rate of systematic failures are only presented for valves (see
examples in Figure D.3 above).
D.2 Application Specific f3
Data for f3 is given in /16/ for different types of SIS equipment. The values presented are generic
values seen as a gross average over the industry. In reliability calculations, this will produce an
“average” result. As also identified by 1EC61508 (Part 6, Appendix D), the beta factor is one of
the parameters that differ the most between different sites. Thus, using an application (or plant)
specific value for beta will produce a more representative calculation. In this appendix we
therefore describe a simple way of obtaining application specific f3 values based on the generic
ones.
As already mentioned in section 5.5, we have assumed that most of the measures that differ from
site to site will mainly influence on ?Du.sysT, and only a few of them (such as actions taken to
increase diversity) will have a direct effect on f3. This is in contrast to the IEC method, where all
measures are related to 13 (and DU-SYST is neglected). We will tie the calculations related to 13 and
XDUSYST together by letting the computation of application specific 13 proceed through two
separate steps: The first step focuses on explicit measures taken to avoid common cause failures.
The second step relates to indirect effects due to measures implemented to avoid or control
systematic failures. The two steps are discussed in separate sections below.
D.2.1 Active Protection against Common Cause Failures
We will use the notation 13* for the application specific value, and introduce a model closely
related to the way7’DUSYST was handled. Specifically, we assume the relationship
13* =k.f3.
Here k is a parameter describing the system’s protection against common-cause failures, and 131s
the generic value assuming “average” protection.
Thus, k = 1 is used when “current practice” is used at the specific plant for which the calculation
is performed, k < 1 implies that extra measures are implemented, and kg,> 1 implies a level of
protection below average against common-cause failures.
IEC 61508-6, Appendix D describes a method for calculating application-specific beta-values. It
involves answering a number of questions under the headlines:
1. Separation/segregation
2. Diversity/redundancy
3. Complexity/design/application/maturity/experience
4. Assessment/analysis andfeedback ofdata
5. Procedures/human interfaces
6. Compete ce/training/safety culture
7. Environmental control
8. Environmental testing
Other work on application specific beta values (like Johnson /19/ and Summers & Raney /20/)
gives checklists with the same themes.
By examining the questions relat d to each heading we observe th t only t e first two are of
interest for the present analysis. The remaining considerations are related to application specific
values of7DUSYST, and were dealt with in section D. 1. Numerical values for k, depending on the
protection against common cause failures, are given in Table D.3.
Table D.3 Protection against common causefailures, k13
k8 Protection Comments
0.1 Very high protection Separation/segregation and diversity/redundancy fully implemented
0.5 Extended protection Some additional protection implemented and documented
1 Normal protection Average level ofprotection — current practice
5 Reduced protection Less protection than typically implemented
The above table applies for any SIS equipment, i.e. the values are equipment generic.
When calculating 13* the implemented measures to avoid CCF have to be described and compared
with a “baseline” for this kind of equipment. A value of k 0.1 requires extreme measures of
protection, and does not seem likely in practice.
Which kind of operational characteristics that actually correspond to the different levels of
protection (Very high, Extended, Normal, Reduced) must be determined for each type of
equipment. As an example, we show how to assess the protection against common cause failures
of ESV valves:
Separation/segregation -
Separation/segregation relates, e.g., to signal cables for each channel being routed separately,
using separate print-boards for logic systems, separating dedicated control logics for each channel,
and using different cabinets. Related to ESV valves, focus should be on using separate sources for
power supply (hydraulic oil, ESD-approved air), physical separation between valves, physical
shielding to common areas, etc.
Diversity/redundancy
Diversity/redundancy applies both in a technical as well as an organizational setting. Related to
the technical implementation, emphasis is put on using different technologies (e.g., displacement
and differential pressure are two different principles for level transmitters), hardwired logic solver
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Figure 5.2: kβ parameters
5.1.4 Reliability Data
For a reliability assessment focusing on the PFD of various SIFs, the rate of dangerous undetected
failures, λDU , and the functional test interval, τ, are the most important parameters, governing
the prediction of how often a safety function is likely to fail on demand. The following data is
needed for each component:
• The rate of Dangerous Undetected failures, λDU
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• The functional test interval, τ
• β-factors for common cause component groups
Other data relevant for the assessment:
• The failure rate of components in continuous operation, λ.
• The MTTR (mean time to repair) of components in continuous operation
Reliability data can be obtained from a variety of sources, such as generic databases, company-
specific databases or joint databases from several companies within the same industry. While
some databases provide failure rates for each relevant failure mode, other databases only pro-
vide total failure rates.
It is important that the data is applicable and conservative, and the IEC 61508 (2010) standard
requires that any failure rate data used for verification purposes should have a statistical confi-
dence level of at least 70% (OLF070, 2004). This means that company-specific databases must
have a lot of data before they can be used for verification purposes.
Through the PDS project (Hauge et al., 2009b), a range of reliability data is analyzed and struc-
tured into a PDS Data Handbook (Hauge et al., 2009a), updated at regular intervals. The data is
primarily obtained from the OREDA data handbooks, and the data provides best average esti-
mates of equipment failure rates based on experience gathered mainly from the petroleum in-
dustry. The OLF070 (2004) guideline use PDS data as the primary source of reliability data.
The OREDA reliability data is based on maintenance reports from single item failures, and as
such contain all failures both independent and CCFs. The status related to the contribution
from CCFs on the data is not fully known (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2007). Through the RABL
project (Østby et al., 1987), a list of reliability data for ballast systems is presented. The data
consist mainly of old OREDA data, and is presented in appendix Figure B.2.
As an expert judgement opinion on what data that should be applied, the PDS data from the
example calculations in the OLF070 (2004) guideline is used and updated with data from the
latest PDS Data Handbook, (Hauge et al., 2009a).
In Figure 5.3 a shortlist of the proposed reliability data is presented, along with applicable β
factors. For a full review of the reliability data see appendix Figure B.7 and B.8.
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Figure 5.3: Shortlist of applicable reliability data
5.2 Stepwise Procedure
The reliability assessment approach is based on the following stepwise procedure:
Step 1: Ballast system familiarization
Step 2: Identification of common cause component groups
Step 3: RBD construction
Step 4: Determination of reliability data
Step 5: PFD calculations
Step 6: Comparison with reliability performance targets
In the following section the different steps will be presented.
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5.2.1 Step 1: Ballast System Familiarization
The first part of the reliability assessment is a thorough review of the ship specific ballast sys-
tem. This is an important part of the procedure, as the subsequent steps and final results are
highly dependent on the findings of the familiarization. The outcome of the review should in-
clude:
• A description of the differences between the ship specific ballast system and the base case
ballast system, and associated implications on the system functions
• A list of the different SIFs, associated functional block diagrams and their criteria for suc-
cessful execution
• Which components that are operated to achieve the SIFs, and how these components may
fail
Relevant sources of information are: P&ID diagrams, flow diagrams, loop drawings for hydraulic
and electrical systems, cause and effect diagrams, operation manuals etc. Design engineers
or personnel familiar with the specific system should be involved in the familiarization pro-
cess.
5.2.2 Step 2: Identification of Common Cause Component Groups
Based on the system familiarization, components that are dependent and may share the same
failure cause shall be included in the same common cause component group. This ensures a
basis for including CCFs in the subsequent calculations. The process is as follows:
• Identify components that are dependent
• Identify if any of these components may share the same common failure cause.
• Include these components in the same common cause component group
5.2.3 Step 3: RBD Construction
The next step is to model the RBDs of the SIFs based on the system familiarization and identified
common cause component groups. For an introduction to RBD modeling, see Rausand and
Høyland (2004). The process is as follows:
• Model the elementary utilities electric and hydraulic power first, and include these utili-
ties as seperate reliability blocks in the RBDs of the SIFs.
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• Model the RBDs of the SIFs one by one, taking into account the voting configuration of
redundant components.
• If common cause component groups have been identified, and these components are part
of a redundant configuration in a SIF, the potential CCF among these components shall be
modeled as a separate block in the RBD.
An important part of the utility modeling, is to include the possibility of loss of main power. If
the switch to backup systems involve any human interaction, the possible non-fulfilment of this
interaction should also be modeled.
A simplification can be made with regards to SIF1, SIF2 and SIF3. These SIFs perform two dif-
ferent operations, ballasting and deballasting, and should be modeled with two RBDs each. A
simplification of the RBD modeling can be made by including both operations in the same RBD,
since both operations are assumed to be carried out with the same amount of valves of almost
the same type.
5.2.4 Step 4: Determination of Reliability Data
The identified components of the ballast system should be coupled with the best available relia-
bility data. Ship-specific data should be used if the data is available, well documented and has a
statistical confidence level of at least 70%. This can be a real challenge, and if ship-specific data
is not available, the data presented in Section 5.1.4 can be used. If expert judgements and other
assumptions are made, these assumptions should be documented.
5.2.5 Step 5: PFD Calculations
Important assumptions must be verified before the PFD of the various SIFs can be calculated.
In Section 5.1.2 these assumptions are listed, and should be verified with design engineers or
operators. The most important assumptions that should be clarified, are:
a) If full functional tests are carried out at regular intervals, and to what extent these tests are
capable of revealing all DU failures.
b) If the operation of the ballast system is stopped once a DU failure is revealed, and whether
or not the failure will be repaired immidiately.
In the reliability assessment approach, it is assumed that the assumptions in Section 5.1.2 are
valid. When the assumptions have been verified, the PFD of the various SIFs can then be calcu-
lated by successively calculating the PFD of the RBDs, using the formulaes from section 5.1.2,
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and reliability data from Section 5.2.4. The calculations can be done by hand, without the use of
specialized software.
5.2.6 Step 6: Comparison with Reliability Performance Targets
The final step is to present the results of the PFD calculations, and compare the results with
the associated reliability performance targets. Deviations from the reliability targets should be
discussed, and the different contributions from the different component groups or failure types
may be extracted, including the contribution from CCFs on the reliability performance.
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5.3 Defense Approach Against CCF in Ballast Systems
CCFs may be introduced during design of ballast systems as well as in the operational phase.
In the following section, issues related to CCFs during ballast system design will be presented
briefly, followed by a defense approach against CCFs to be used in the operational phase.
Design Phase: In the design phase, designers have the possibility to reduce the level of sys-
tematic failures to a minimum, reducing the systems potential for CCF. As presented in Section
3.2.1, systematic failures are dependent failures that can lead to CCFs, and special care should
be made when choosing software systems, hardware components and installation procedures
for the final design. Examples of potential sources for CCF introduced in the design phase may
be:
• Design related: Pumps installed in the same location with the same external environmen-
tal exposure. Ballast valves not specified for operation in cold environments. Pump room
valves with identical design, installed in the same environment. Ballast control station
vulnerable to water ingress.
• Software related: Ballast control logic programming error, resulting in latent errors.
• Installation related: Valves installed in the wrong direction. Pollution in the hydraulic
supply lines after pipe cutting and installation.
Operational Phase: In the operational phase the main source of CCF are failures introduced
during functional testing, inspection and improper use of the system. The systematic failures
described as excessive stress- and operational failures in Section 3.2.1, are introduced in this
phase, and may lead to CCFs.
5.3.1 Defence Approach
As CCFs introduced in the operational phase will have a great impact on the reliability perfor-
mance of the ballast system, a defense approach is presented, that can improve the operators
ability to detect CCFs and avoid introducing new CCFs in the operational phase. These experi-
ences can later be used in the design of new ballast systems. The defence approach is valuable as
a tool to monitor the level of CCF on a systems, and can provide input into calculation methods
developed to monitor the SIL level of SIFs in the operational phase.
The proposed CCF defense approach is based on an approach presented in Lundteigen and
Rausand (2007), adapted to suit ballast systems. The CCF defense approach may be integrated
with current practices for function testing, inspection and follow up of other safety critical equip-
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ment on the FPSO. The approach is built around a general function test and inspection proce-
dure presented through the activity blocks in Figure 5.4, adopted from Lundteigen and Rausand
(2007). The tasks in the defence approach are:
Task 1: Proper planning of function tests and inspection
Task 2: Avoid introducing CCFs during function tests and inspection
Task 3: Improve the quality of failure reporting
Task 4: Identify CCFs through failure analysis
Task 5: Implement defense measures
Task 6: Validation and continuous improvement
implementation or operational related errors. The IEC
standards suggest, as a general rule, not to quantify
systematic failures. However, some systematic failures are
quantified through the modeling of CCFs.
It may be convenient to distinguish between classifica-
tion systems for failure reporting and classification systems
for in-depth failure analysis. For failure reporting it is
important that the taxonomy is intuitive and easy to
understand, giving an initial and rough classification. For
failure analysis one may add more detailed taxonomy, as
suggested in OREDA (2002).
5. New CCF defense approach
In this section, we describe a new CCF defense approach
which may be integrated with current approaches for
function testing, inspection and follow-up. The new
approach focuses on the following key aspects: (1) to
avoid introducing CCFs during function testing and
inspection, (2) to identify CCFs and CCF causes based
on failure reports, and (3) to use the insight of failure
causes to select efficient means to defend against future
CCFs. The approach may be integrated into existing
function testing and inspection related work processes, and
has been designed to avoid any significant additional work-
load on plant workers. The approach builds on experience
from the nuclear power industry (Hellstrøm, Johanson, &
Bento, 2004; Hirschberg, 1991; Johanson et al., 2003;
Parry, 1991; Paula et al., 1991; NUREG/CR-5460, 1990),
the process industry (Summers & Raney, 1999), the oil and
gas industry (Hauge et al., 2004, 2006) and own experience
from maintaining SIS on oil and gas installations.
The CCF defense approach follows the main tasks of
function testing and inspection that are described in
Section 3 and illustrated in Fig. 2. The six activities are
based on checklists and analytical methods like operational
sequence diagrams (OSD), influence diagrams and cause-
defense matrices.
5.1. Task 1: ensure that necessary improvements are
captured when scheduling
Scheduling of function test and inspection procedures is
usually performed automatically and with predefined
intervals by the maintenance management system. During
the scheduling process, a work package is created specify-
ing the type of resources, estimated number of hours
needed to perform the work and the test procedure to be
used. An important defense against CCFs is to ensure that
any corrections and improvements to the test procedure are
captured when new function test or inspection work
packages are created.
5.2. Task 2: avoid introducing CCFs during preparation,
execution, and restoration
Experience shows that CCFs are often introduced during
maintenance due to human errors, erroneous procedures
and deficient work processes (Hellstrøm et al., 2004; Pyy
et al., 1997). Human errors may be deliberate actions (e.g.,
carelessness due to inappropriate understanding of the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
ICDE classification of common causes (NEA, 2004)
Classification of root causes Classification of coupling factors
State of other components Same/similar hardware
Design, manufacture or Hardware design
construction inadequacy System design
Human actions Hardware quality deficiency
Maintenance Same/similar operational conditions
Internal to co ponent Maintenance/test schedule
Procedure inadequacy Maintenance/test procedure
Abnormal environmental stress Maintenance/test staff
Other Operation procedur
Operation staff
Same/similar environmental exposure
Internal
External
Other
Preparation Execution Restoration
Failure reporting
Validation
and continuous
improvements
(Task 6)
Scheduling
Implementation Failure analysis
Avoid introducing CCFs (Task 2)
Improve quality of
failure descriptions
(Task 3)
Identify CCFs and
related causes (Task 4)
Select and implement
defenses (Task 5)
Ensure that  neces-
sary improvements
are captured
(Task 1)
Fig. 2. Main concepts of the CCF defense approach.
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Figure 5.4: Main concepts of the CCF defense approach
Task 1: Proper planning of function tests and inspection
The defense approach will iteratively provide corrections to the function test and inspection
procedure. Ensure that the latest improvements are updated in the maintenance management
system before the next test.
Task 2: Avoid introducing CCFs during function tests and inspection
Function tests and inspections should be carried out with high awareness to CCF causes, as hu-
man errors, erroneous procedures and deficient work processes are potential sources of CCFs.
Lundteigen and Rausand (2007) recommends the use of checklists to improve the defense against
CCFs in these activities, and suggest the use of different checklists for preparation, execution
and restoration. Deviations may then be discussed and compensated with the responsible tech-
nician. The slightly modified checklists are presented in Table 5.2, based on Lundteigen and
Rausand (2007):
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Checklist for preperation Yes/No
(1) Have potential human errors during execution and restoration been identified
and discussed?
Y/N
(2) Have human error incidents been experienced during previous execution? Y/N
(3) Have compensating measures been identified and implemented to avoid hu-
man errors?
Y/N
(4) Are the personnel executing the test familiar with the test procedure? Y/N
(5) Does the procedure have known deficiencies? Y/N
(6) Does the procedure describe the necessary steps to safely restore the sys-
tem/component?
Y/N
Checklist for execution Yes/No
(1) Are the components operated within the specified environmental and operat-
ing conditions?
Y/N
(2) Are the components protected against damage from nearby work activities? Y/N
(3) Are all the ballast system components labeled? Y/N
Checklist for restoration Yes/No
(1) Has the physical restoration of the components been verified? Y/N
(2) Are any remaining inhibits, overrides or bypasses logged, and compensating
measures identified and implemented?
Y/N
(3) Has the safety function been verified before start-up? Y/N
Table 5.2: Checklists for preparation, execution and restoration during function tests and in-
spections
Task 3: Improve the quality of failure reporting
Operators should report failures related to the ballast system components the same way as they
would for other safety critical equipment.
Failure reporting should involve free text descriptions of failure causes, effects and detection
methods, which can be used to verify the initial failure classification, and provide necessary in-
formation to decide whether a CCF has occured. The following set of checklist questions based
on Lundteigen and Rausand (2007) may be used during free text failure reporting.
Questions for free text description
(1) How was the failure discovered?
(2) What is believed to be the cause(s) of failure?
(3) What was the effect of failure on the ballast system function?
(4) Was the component tested or inspected differently than in the procedure? If
yes, why?
(5) Has the component been overexposed to operational or environmental stress?
If yes, what is the cause?
(6) Have similar failures been experienced previously?
Table 5.3: Questions for free text description during failure reporting
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Task 4: Identify CCFs through failure analysis
Based on failure reports from the maintenance management system, the next step is to analyse
and identify CCFs for the purpose of selecting appropriate defenses. Lundteigen and Rausand
(2007) suggests a stepwise procedure
• Step1: Review the failure description and verify/correct the initial failure classification
• Step2: Perform an initial screening that captures failures that
– a) have similar design or physical location
– b) share failure causes
– c) have been discovered within the same test or inspection interval
– d) are not random failures as defined in section 3.2.1.
• Step3: Perform a root cause and coupling factor analysis of each identified CCF.
– The analysis is a critical part of the defense approach, as it provides insight into the
causes of CCF, and basis for identifying effective defenses.
– If the root cause of a failure is difficult to identify, defenses against the coupling factor
may be enough to stop reoccurence of the CCF.
– The analysis should be carried out by a group of personnel.
– A root cause and coupling factor analysis diagram can be used, as presented in Lundteigen
and Rausand (2007).
• Step4: List the root cause and coupling factors in a cause-defense matrix, as presented in
figure 5.5
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Figure 5.5: Cause defense matrix
Task 5: Implement defense measures.
Appropriate defenses against root causes and coupling factors may be found by considering a
list of generic defense options, as in Figure 5.6, adopted from Lundteigen and Rausand (2007)
which take into account possible design, procedural and physical improvements. The generic
defense options should be considered a starting point for more specific defenses.
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defense matrices for the nuclear industry (but with other
symbols). The cost impact may be evaluated qualitatively
(high (H), medium (M) or low (L)) or quantitatively (based
on a cost estimate). If the costs are considered quantita-
tively, the cost impact may include design and installation
costs or the life cycle costs. For each selected defense, it
should be indicated if the root cause (R), the coupling
factor (C) or both are affected. The information may be
useful for assessing the estimated impact on reliability
parameters, for example, the b-factor (in case the b-factor
model is selected) or the dangerous failure rate. At the
current stage, the CCF defense approach does not
recommend how the reliability parameters should be
updated.
5.6. Task 6: validation and continuous improvements
Systematic failures that may lead to CCFs, are not
always captures through execution and follow-up of
function testing and inspection. According to Summers
and Raney (1999), the most critical cause of CCFs during
SIS design and implementation is an erroneous or
incomplete safety requirement specification. If, for exam-
ple, an inadequate fire protection is specified, the detectors
may fail to detect a real fire. The similar argument may be
relevant for the operational phase; if the work processes,
procedures, tools and competence are inappropriate for
avoidance, identification and follow-up of CCFs, they may
not provide the intended protection against CCFs.
Validating all work tasks at regular intervals with respect
to how they comply with the new approach may capture
weaknesses and lead to continuous improvement. It may
also be relevant to evaluate the effect of implemented
defenses, either qualitatively or quantitatively.
The CCF defense approach suggests two new validation
activities: (1) task analysis of function testing and inspec-
tion execution, and (2) use of a new validation checklist.
The task analysis is suitable for capturing the causes of
human interaction failures (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992),
and the selected approach builds on operational sequence
diagrams OSD as illustrated in Fig. 4. One may choose to
concentrate on those work processes that are related to SIS
components where CCFs or CCF causes have been
experienced. The new validation checklist builds on the
SIS life cycle checklists proposed by Summers and Raney
(1999). Many oil and gas companies perform regular audits
of, for example, SIS follow-up and performance. Some of
the questions suggested for the validation checklist may
therefore be covered by existing audit procedures.
Checklist questions for validation:
(1) Are requirements for the safety function covered by
the function test or inspection procedure(s)?
(2) Are all disciplines involved in SIS testing, inspection,
maintenance and follow-up familiar with the concept
of CCFs?
(3) Are dangerous undetected failure modes known and
sufficiently catered for in the function test and
inspection procedures?
(4) Are the test limitations (compared to the real demand
conditions) known?
(5) Are all redundant channels of the safety function
covered by the function test or inspection procedures?
(6) Are failures introduced during function testing and
inspection captured, analyzed and used to improve the
associated procedures?
(7) Are failures detected upon real demands analyzed to
verify that they would have been detected during a
function test or inspection?
(8) Are changes in operating or environmental conditions
captured and analyzed for necessary modifications to
the SIS or related procedures?
(9) Are the calibration and test tools suitable and
maintained according to the vendor recommenda-
tions?
(10) Are personnel using the calibration and test tools
familiar with their application?
(11) Are procedure deficiencies communicated to the
responsible persons and followed up?
(12) Are the diagnostic alarms followed up within the
specified mean time to restoration?
(13) Are CCF systematically identified and analyzed, and
defenses implemented to prevent their recurrence?
Questions given the answer ‘‘no’’ indicate a potential
weakness in the defense against CCFs, and should be
discussed to determine corrective actions.
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Table 3
Generic defense options
Administrative Improved preparation
control Improved coordination
Improved responsibilities
Improved feedback of experience
Improved safety culture
Improved training
Improved quality control
Documentation Improved drawings
Improved functional description
Procedures New procedure
Improved procedure text (clarification,
added scope or information)
Improved quality control of restoration
Improved test tools and calibration
Monitoring and
surveillance
New alarm or alert. Implementation must
follow IEC 61508 (1998)/61511 (2003)
New condition or logic sequence
Physical barriers Improved physical support or fastening
Improved physical protection
Hardware or software
modifications of SIS
Modifications requiring design changes.
Redesign following IEC 61508 (1998)/61511
(2003)
M.A. Lundteigen, M. Rausand / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 218–229226
Figure 5.6: Generic defense options against CCF
Selected defences should be listed in the cause-defense matrix, with indication of whether the
root cause or the coupling factor is affected. Evaluations on impact and cost may also be added,
where impact is understood as the ability of the defense measure to protect against future oc-
curences.
Task 6: Validation and continuous improvement
The activities related to function testing and inspection, as well as the approach taken to mini-
mize the potential for CCFs during these activities, should be subject to regu ar validation nd
improvements. M int nance personnel and t chnician should continuously improve the test-
ing and inspection procedures, and evalute the defenses implemented against CCFs. As an aid
the validation of the activities in the operational phase, the checklist for validation in Table 5.4
can be used. The checklist is adopted from Lundteigen and Rausand (2007).
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Checklist for validation Yes/No
(1) Are the requirements for the safety function covered by the function test or
inspection procedure(s)?
Y/N
(2) Are all personnel involved in ballast system testing, inspection, maintenance
and follow up familiar with the CCF concept?
Y/N
(3) Are dangerous undetected failure modes known and catered for in the func-
tion test and inspection procedures?
Y/N
(4) Are the test limitations known? Y/N
(5) Are all redundant channels of the safety functions covered by the function test
or inspection procedure?
Y/N
(6) Are failures introduced during function testing and inspection captured, ana-
lyzed and used to improve the associated procedures?
Y/N
(7) Are failure detected during real demands analyzed to verify that they would
have been detected during a function test or inspection?
Y/N
(8) Are changes in operating or environmental conditions captured and analyzed
for necessary modifications to the ballast system or related procedures?
Y/N
(9) Are the calibration and test tools suitable and maintained according to the
vendor recommendations?
Y/N
(10) Are personnel using the calibration and test tools familiar with their applica-
tion?
Y/N
(11) Are procedure deficiencies followed up? Y/N
(13) Are CCF systematically identified and analyzed, and defenses implemented
to precent their reoccurence?
Y/N
Table 5.4: Checklists for preparation, execution and restoration during functional tests and in-
spections
Chapter 6
Case example: Petrojarl Foinaven FPSO
In this chapter a case example of the reliability assessment approach is presented. The reliabil-
ity assessment approach is conducted on a ship shaped FPSO owned and operated by Teekay
Petrojarl, one of the worlds leading FPSO operators.
6.0.2 Presentation of the Foinaven FPSO
The Petrojarl Foinaven, is a purpose built FPSO designed for oil production in the ultra harsh
environments of the North Sea. The FPSO was delivered by Astano of Spain in 1996, and is
currently operating on the Foinaven Field in the UK sector of the North Sea. The ship complies
with the British continental shelf regulations, and is classified with DNV.
The ship´s production facilities comprise two parallel two stage separation trains for separation
of crude oil, gas and produced water. The crude oil is temporarily stored in cargo tanks onboard,
for subsequent offloading to shuttle tankers. The produced gas is used for generation of electric-
ity, fuel to boilers, gas lift and is also exported to a nearby field for increased recovery purposes
(Petrojarl, 2011b). The Petrojarl Foinaven FPSO in numbers:
Length overall 250.2 m
Breadth 34.0 m
Draught 12.8 m
Deadweight 43.2769 tonnes
Oil storage capacity 260000 bbls
Total ballast tank capacity 33580 m3
Crude oil production capacity 140000 bopd
Riser/umbilicals connected 12
Table 6.1: Petrojarl Foinaven FPSO in numbers
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Figure 6.1: Teekay Petrojarl Foinaven
Ensuring proper stability of the ship is a high priority concern on the Foinaven FPSO. Due to a
combination of a typically heavy topside design and a suboptimal cargo tank design, the vessel
is highly dependent on a properly functioning ballast system to ensure acceptable inclination
and draft of the vessel.
6.1 Reliability Assessment of the Foinaven FPSO Ballast System
The main body of the Foinaven FPSO consist of a double bottom and a double hull divided into
ballast tanks on port and starbord side of the ship. Three main ballast pumps are located in the
aft ballast pump room.
In addition to the main ballast tanks, one ballast tank is located at each side of the turret, and
ballast tanks are also arranged in the forward and aft sections of the vessel. These tanks are op-
erated by two ballast trim pumps located in the aft engine room, and two ballast trim pumps
in the forward engine room. These additional ballast tank systems will not be included in the
assessment. In the following sections, the stepwise procedure of the reliability assessment ap-
proach is conducted.
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6.1.1 Step 1: Ballast System Familiarization
Main deviations from the base case ballast system
The ballast system on the Foinaven FPSO is similar to the base case ballast system in Section
3.1.1, but some important deviations exist. The system familiarization is based on a detailed
study of the Foinaven ballast system presented in appendix Figures B.9 and B.10, an interviews
with personnel familiar with the specific system. The main deviations and the related implica-
tions on the system functions is presented:
Ballast Tank Configuration, Pumps and Valves:
• The ballast tank valves are of fail-to-set design.
– Implication: Upon loss of electric power, hydraulic power or control of the ballast
operation, the ballast valves will not fail to a safe position, and water migration is
possible in and out of the open ballast tank.
• Three pumproom valves are hydraulically operated throttle valves.
– Implication: Not accounted for. Assumed identical to butterfly valves.
Electric Power System
• Upon loss of main electric power, all hydraulically operated valves are unavailable for op-
eration. In order to regain control of the valves, the emergency backup system must be
functioning, and three hydraulic cabinets for operation of hydraulic valves must be reset
by physically locating and reseting the hydraulic cabinets Petrojarl (2011a). The cabinets
are located in three different sections of the ship.
– Implication: Critical barrier function unavailability upon main electric power loss.
Multiple human error possibilities during resetting operation.
Hydraulic Power System
• Assumed identical to base case hydraulic system
Ballast Control System
• The emergency stop function only stops the ballast pumps.
– Implication: Critically reduced emergency stop barrier function. Emergency stop
barrier function ineffective during gravity based ballasting operations to sea, or dur-
ing pumpless ballasting operation between starbord and portside ballast tanks.
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• The ballast system can be fully controlled from the bridge or from a designated NCC con-
trol room.
– Implication: Enhanced redundancy in the control system. The redundancy has not
been accounted for due to the extensive assessment needed to fully verify the actual
level of redundancy in the control system. Assumed identical to base case ballast
control system.
Description of the SIFs and Associated Components
The Foinaven FPSO ballast system is capable of performing SIF1, SIF2 and SIF3 as described
in Section 3.1.5. The emergency stop function on Foinaven does not fulfill the requirements of
SIF4. In order to fulfill the requirements of SIF4, the emergency stop function must meet all the
prerequisites of a successful operation, not only stop ballast pumps upon demand.
• SIF 1: To ballast/deballast starbord ballast tank system in response to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the starbord ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
to sea in response to operator command, by using ballast pump 2 or 3. (2) The bal-
lasting operation stops upon operator command.
• SIF 2: To ballast/deballast portside ballast tank system in response to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the portside ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
to sea in response to operator command, by using ballast pump 1 or 2. (2) The bal-
lasting operation stops upon operator command.
• SIF 3: To ballast/deballast between starbord and portside ballast tank system in response
to operator command
– The SIF is successful when: (1) One of the portside ballast tanks is ballasted/deballasted
with one of the starbord ballast tanks in response to operator command, by using
ballast pump 1, 2 or 3. (2) The ballasting operation stops upon operator command.
• SIF 4: Emergency stop of ballast system operation in response to operator command
– Not accounted for.
6.1.2 Step 2: Identification of Common Cause Component Groups
The main common cause component groups are:
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Common cause component group
Ballast valves Identical design
Same internal and external environ-
mental exposure
Same hydraulic supply
Same potential failure causes
Pumps Identical design
Same internal and external environ-
mental exposure
Same electric supply
Same potential failure causes
Pump room valves Identical design
Same internal and external environ-
mental exposure
Same hydraulic supply
Same potential failure causes
Table 6.2: List of identified common cause component groups
A major source of potential for CCFs may be found if the ballast control system is subject to a
full system breakdown and analysis. The operator controls, the control logic, and all associated
electrical components located in the same area may be susceptible to CCF, with reference to the
Ocean Ranger accident. In the case study, the ballast control system is assumed identical to the
simplified single unit control system in the base case system.
The potential for common cause failure amongst the components in the electric and hydraulic
power systems have not been accounted for.
6.1.3 Step 2: RBD Construction
RBD Modeling of Elementary Utilities
RBD Electric Power System
The RBD of the electric power system is modeled as a redundant system, with two separate
channels.
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Figure 6.2: RBDel
In case of loss of main electric power, the RBD represents the necessary blocks needed to ful-
fill the function. The UPS reliability block represent the UPSs necessary to support the ballast
control system and operator screens. The emergency backup generator is represented by an in-
dividual block. The possible non-fulfillment of the human interactions needed to regain control
of the ballast system upon loss of main electric power is represented by three Human Error reli-
ability blocks. The three blocks represent the three human interactions needed at three seperate
locations.
RBD Hydraulic Power System
The RBD of the hydraulic power system is modeled as a redundant system, with two seperate
channels, to highlight the accumulator function in case of loss of main hydraulic power.
Main
Hydraulic 
power
Hydraulic 
accumulator
Figure 6.3: RBDhyd
RBD Modeling of Individual SIFs
The SIFs are modeled by evaluating the components needed to execute the different functions
according to the success criteria of the different SIFs. The RBDs of the SIFs are modeled based
on the system familiarization in step 1. As the operator can choose any of the ballast tanks on
each side of the vessel to carry out SIF1, SIF2 and SIF3, this option is modeled as a redundant
configuration with a 1oo5 voting. Pump functions are modeled with the respective voting of
the pumps. Potential CCFs in redundant configurations are modeled as separate blocks in the
RBDs.
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RBD1. SIF 1: To ballast/deballast starbord ballast tank system in response to operator command
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Figure 6.4: RBD1
RBD2. SIF 2: To ballast/deballast portside ballast tank system in response to operator command
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Figure 6.5: RBD2
RBD3. SIF 3: To ballast/deballast between starbord and portside ballast tank system in response
to operator command
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Figure 6.6: RBD3
RBD4. SIF 4: Em rgency stop of ballast system operation in response to operator command
Not accounted for.
6.1.4 Step 4: Determine Relevant Reliability Data
Ship-specific data is not available for the assessment. Reliability data is collected from section
5.1.4, and presented in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Reliability data used in the case example
No. Description of assumptions related to reliability data
1 Ballast valves, pump room valves and discharge/seachest valves are assumed
to be function tested every 3 months (2190 hours)
2 The ballast control logic is assumed to be function tested once per year (8760
hours)
3 The estimated failure rates and MTTR of the components in continuous op-
eration:
Main electric power generators: λ= 1/8760 (Once per year), MTTR= 10h.
UPS: λ= 1/8760 (Once per year), MTTR= 10h.
Main hydraulic power generator: λ= 3·10−6 (RABL), MTTR= 10h.
Hydraulic accumulator: λ= 1/8760 (Once per year), MTTR= 10h.
4 The PFD of a ballast pump includes only "fail to start". The valve failure rates
only include the DU failure mode "fail to open".
5 The human interventions are assumed equal to "Operator response to
alarms" in table 5.1. PFDHE =0,1
Table 6.3: Description of assumptions
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6.1.5 Step 5: PFD Calculations
For the PFD calculations, it is assumed that all assumptions in 5.1.2 are valid. The elementary
utilities are calculated first, followed by calculations of the various SIFs. For all calculations, the
formulaes from section 5.1.2 are used together with reliability data from figure 6.7.
PFD Elementary Utilities
PFD Electric Power System
Main
Electric 
Power
UPS Backup generatorHE HEHE
Figure 6.8: RBDelec
The RBD consist of a complex 1oon-configuration comprising different types of components.
Calculating PFDel ec is done by utilizing the non-conservative approximation from 5.4 coupled
with the correction factor from 5.5. The PFD of the human interventions are assumed equal to
"Operator response to alarms" in Table 5.1.
PF Dchannel 1 = PF DM ai nel ec ≈ Aav str ek ≈λ ·MT T R =
1
8760
·10= 1,14 ·10−3
PF Dchannel 2 = PF DHE +PF DHE +PF DHE +PF DU PS +PF Dbackupg en
PF DHE = 0,1
PF DU PS ≈ Aav str ek ≈λ ·MT T R =
1
8760
·10= 1,14 ·10−3
PF Dbackupg en = 9,4 ·10−4
PF Dchannel 2 = 0,1+0,1+0,1+1,14 ·10−3+9,4 ·10−4 = 3,02 ·10−1
PF Del ec = PF Dchannel 1·PF Dchannel 2·C F1oo2 = (1,14·10−3)channel 1·(3,02·10−1)channel 2·4/3= 4,6 ·10−4
PFD Hydraulic Power System
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Figure 6.9: RBDhyd
The RBD consist of two non-identical items configured as 1oo2-configuration. Calculating PFD-
hydr is done by utilizing the non-conservative approximation from 5.4 coupled with the correc-
tion factor from 5.5. The
PF Dchannel 1 = PF DM ai nhyd ≈ Aav str ek ≈λ ·MT T R = 3 ·10−6 ·10= 3 ·10−5
PF Dchannel 2 = PF D Acc ≈ Aav str ek ≈λ ·MT T R =
1
8760
·10= 1,14 ·10−3
PF Dhydr = PF Dchannel 1·PF Dchannel 2·C F1oo2 = (3·10−5)channel 1·(1,14·10−3)channel 2·4/3= 4,6 ·10−8
PFD of Ballast Pumps
Since the reliability data identified for the ballast pumps only include the "fail to start" on de-
mand failure mode, the PFD of redundant ballast pump configurations should be calculated
with some care, especially when including CCFs. For a 1oo2 pump configuration, the PFD1oo2pumps
can be calculated by utilizing the non-conservative approximation from 5.4 coupled with the
correction factor from 5.5:
PF D1oo2pumps = PF Dpump ·PF Dpump ·C F1oo2 = (9,4·10−4)pump ·(9,4·10−4)pump ·(4/3)= 1,2 ·10−6
For a 1oo2 pump configuration modeled with CCF:
PF D i nd1oo2pumps +PF DCC F1oo2pumps =
((1−β1oo2)λDUτ)2
3
+β1oo2λDUτ
2
= ((1−β1oo2)2·PF D1oo2pumps))i nd1oo2pumps+(β1oo2·PF Dpump )CC F1oo2pumps
= ((1−β1oo2)2 ·1,2 ·10−6)i nd1oo2pumps + (β1oo2 ·9,4 ·10−4)CC F1oo2pumps
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For a 1oo3 pump configuration modeled with CCF:
PF D1oo3pumps = PF Dpump ·PF Dpump ·PF Dpump ·C F1oo3 = 9,4·10−4·9,4·10−4·9,4·10−4·(2)= 2 ·10−9
PF D i nd1oo3pumps +PF DCC F1oo3pumps =
((1−β1oo3)λDUτ)3
4
+β1oo3λDUτ
2
= ((1−β1oo3)3·PF D1oo3pumps)i nd1oo3pumps+(β1oo3·PF Dpump )CC F1oo3pumps
((1−β1oo3)3 ·2,0 ·10−9)i nd1oo3pumps + (β1oo3 ·9,4 ·10−4)CC F1oo3pumps
PFD of SIFs
PFD SIF1: To ballast/deballast starbord ballast tank system in response to operator com-
mand
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Figure 6.10: RBD1
The RBD of SIF1 consist of a series structure of non-identical items. The two elementary utility
functions, electric power and hydraulic power, are identical to the corresponding RBDs in Sec-
tion 6.1.5. Ballast control logic is modeled as a single item. The redundant ballast pump function
is modeled as a single item with a 1oo2 configuration, with β1oo2 =C1oo2 ·β= 1,0 ·0,05= 0,05.
The contribution from CCF of the pumps is modeled as a seperate item in the RBD. The redun-
dant valve configuration is modeled as a single item with a 1oo5 configuration, with β1oo5 =
C1oo5 ·β= 0,21 ·0,03= 0,0063. The contribution from CCF of the valves is modeled as a seperate
item in the RBD. Finally, the pumproom valves and the discharge/seachest valve are modeled
as single items.
PF DSI F 1 = PF Dlog i c +PF Del ec +PF Dhydr +PF D (i nd)1oo2pumps +PF D (CC F )1oo2pumps
+PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesSB +PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesSB +PF Dpr v +PF Dpr v +PF Dpr v +PF Dd sv
Pumps: PF D (i nd)1oo2pumps +PF D (CC F )1oo2pumps =
= ((1−0,05)2·1,2·10−6)i nd1oo2pumps+(0,05·9,4·10−4)CC F1oo2pumps = (1,2·10−6)i nd1oo2pumps+(4,7·10−5)CC F1oo2pumps
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Ballast valves: PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesSB +PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesSB =
((1−β1oo5)λDU ,V ·τ)5
6
+ β1oo5λDU ,V ·τ
2
=
((1−0,0063) ·3 ·10−6 ·2190)5
6
+ 0,0063 ·3 ·10
−6 ·2190
2
= (2 ·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves+ (2,1 ·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves
PF DSI F 1 = (1 ·10
−6 ·8760
2
)log i c+(4,6·10−4)el ec+(4,6·10−8)hydr+(1,2·10−6)i nd1oo2pumps+(4,7·10−5)CC F1oo2pumps
+(2 ·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves + (2,1 ·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves +3 · (
3 ·10−6 ·2190
2
)pr v + (3 ·10
−6 ·2190
2
)d sv
PF DSI F 1 = (4,4·10−3)log i c+(4,6·10−4)el ec+(4,6·10−8)hydr+(1,2·10−6)i nd1oo2pumps+(4,7·10−5)CC F1oo2pumps
+(2 ·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves + (2,1 ·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves +3 · (3,3 ·10−3)pr v + (3,3 ·10−3)d sv
PF DSI F 1 = 1,8 ·10−2
PFD SIF2: To ballast/deballast portside ballast tank system in response to operator com-
mand
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Figure 6.11: RBD2
The RBD of SIF2 consist of a series structure of non-identical items. The two elementary utility
functions, electric power and hydraulic power, are identical to the corresponding RBDs in sec-
tion 6.1.5. Ballast control logic is modeled as a single item. The redundant ballast pump function
is modeled as a single item with a 1oo2 configuration, with β1oo2 =C1oo2 ·β= 1,0 ·0,05= 0,05.
The contribution from CCF of the pumps is modeled as seperate item in the RBD. The redun-
dant valve configuration is modeled as a single item with a 1oo5 configuration, with β1oo5=
C1oo5 ·β= 0,21 ·0,03= 0,0063. The contribution from CCF of the valves is modeled as a seperate
item in the RBD. Finally, the pumproom valve and the discharge/seachest valve are modeled as
single items.
For the Foinaven FPSO, SIF1 and SIF1 have identical RBD setups. The reliability blocks refer to
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other components, but since they are the same type of components, the outcome of the calcu-
lation will be the same if the same data is used and the same assumptions hold.
For this case example, it assumed that the same assumptions hold for the components in SIF1
and SIF2. The PFD of SIF2 will then be same as the PFD of SIF1.
PF DSI F 2 = PF DSI F 1 = 1,8 ·10−2
PFD SIF3: To ballast/deballast between starbord and portside ballast tank system in response
to operator command
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Figure 6.12: RBD3
The RBD of SIF3 onsist of a series structure of non-identical items. The two elementary util-
ity functions, electric power and hydraulic power, are identical to the corresponding RBDs in
Section 6.1.5. Ballast control logic is modeled as a single item. The redundant ballast pump
function is modeled as a single item with a 1oo3 configuration. The contribution from CCF of
the pumps is modeled as seperate item in the RBD, with β1oo3 =C1oo3 ·β= 0,30 ·0,05= 0,015.
The redundant valve configurations are modeled as single items with 1 o5 configurations, with
β1oo5 =C1oo5 ·β= 0,21 ·0,03= 0,0063. The contribution from CCF of the valves is modeled as
seperate items in the RBD. Finally, the pumproom valve is included as a single item.
PF DSI F 3 = PF Dlog i c +PF Del ec +PF Dhydr +PF D (i nd)1oo3pumps +PF D (CC F )1oo3pumps
+PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesPS +PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesPS +PF Dpr v +PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesSB PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesSB
Pumps: PF D (i nd)1oo3pumps +PF D (CC F )1oo3pumps =
((1−0,015)3 ·2,0 ·10−9)i nd1oo3pumps + (0,015 ·9,4 ·10−4)CC F1oo3pumps
(2 ·10−9)i nd1oo3pumps + (1,41 ·10−5)CC F1oo3pumps
Ballast valves PS: PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesPS+PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesPS =
((1−β1oo5)λDU ,V ·τ)5
6
+β1oo5λDU ,V ·τ
2
=
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((1−0,0063) ·3 ·10−6 ·2190)5
6
+ 0,0063 ·3 ·10
−6 ·2190
2
= (2 ·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves+ (2,1 ·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves
Ballast valves SB: PF D (i nd)1oo5val vesPS+PF D (CC F )1oo5val vesPS =
((1−β1oo5)λDU ,V ·τ)5
6
+β1oo5λDU ,V ·τ
2
=
((1−0,0063) ·3 ·10−6 ·2190)5
6
+ 0,0063 ·3 ·10
−6 ·2190
2
= (2 ·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves+ (2,1 ·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves
PF DSI F 3 = (4,4·10−3)log i c+(4,6·10−4)el ec+(4,6·10−8)hydr+(2·10−9)i nd1oo3pumps+(1,41·10−5)CC F1oo3pumps
+(2·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves+(2,1·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves+(3,3·10−3)pr v+(2·10−12)i nd1oo5val ves+(2,1·10−5)CC F1oo5val ves
PF DSI F 3 = 8,22 ·10−3
6.1.6 Step 6: Comparison with Reliability Performance Targets
In Table 6.4, the calculated PFD values are compared to the minimum SIL performance require-
ments presented in Table 3.2.
Reliability
target
Target
achieved
PFDSI F
Foinaven SIF1 SIL1 Yes 1,8 ·10−2
Foinaven SIF2 SIL1 Yes 1,8 ·10−2
Foinaven SIF3 SIL1 Yes 8,22 ·10−3
Foinaven SIF4 SIL2 N/A N/A
Table 6.4: Comparison with reliability performance targets
The results of the calculations show that the ballast system on the Foinaven FPSO is fully capable
of reaching the proposed minimum reliability performance requirements for ballast systems, as
long as all the assumptions from Table 6.3 hold, including the various functional test intervals.
It should be emphasized that most of the reliability data used is not ship specific, but based on
applicable data gathered from the offshore industry. In order to reduced the CCF potential in the
operational phase to a minimum, the CCF defense approach from Section 5.3 may be applied.
In addition to the quantitative results, the reliability assessment identified several critical devi-
ations from the base case ballast system leading to reduced safety barrier functionality. These
deviations and their implication on the system functions are presented in Section 6.1.1.
Chapter 7
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
The main objective of the master thesis has been to suggest a reliability assessment approach
for ballast systems, and include recommendations to how reliability requirements should be set
for this type of system. As a part of fulfilling the main objectives, a series of tasks have been
performed.
The literature survey is presented in three parts. The first part document previous work in the
field of ballast system reliability in Section 1.2, the second part present the regulations governing
ballast systems on the NCS in Section 2, and the third part document the reported safety and
reliability challenges, incidents and accidents related to ballast systems in Chapter 4.
As a basis for the reliability assessment approach, a typical ballast on a ship shaped vessel is
presented in Chapter 3, and the interface between the system and the electric and hydraulic
power systems on the ship is described. The system and the main components are presented
at a level of detail that provides a foundation for reliability assessments of different ballast sys-
tem designs. The safety critical functions of the system are identified and the ballast system is
defined as a safety barrier against unacceptable inclination and draft of the vessel.
The ballast system is then classified as a SIS, and the safety critical functions of the ballast system
are classified as SIFs installed to protect against hazards that may lead to loss of stability and
draft of the vessel. The concept of safe state of the FPSO is discussed in Section 3.1.5, and the
desired behaviour upon fault conditions for the ballast system components is described.
81
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A HAZID and hazard-barrier matrix is used to analyze the adequacy of the ballast system as a
barrier, and in Section 3.2 a failure analysis is conducted to identify failure causes and failure
modes that may influence the reliability performance of ballast systems, including the possibil-
ity of having CCFs among the components. A FMECA is conducted and documented in work-
sheet B.3, B.4 and B.5.
Relevant methods for defining reliability performance requirements for ballast systems are pre-
sented and discussed in Section 3.3. The risk based approach of the IEC 61508 (2010) standard
is compared to the minimum SIL requirement approach from the OLF070 (2004) guideline. The
minimum SIL requirement approach is chosen as the state-of-the-art approach for defining SIL
requirements to ballast system SIFs, and a set of proposed minimum SIL requirements are pre-
sented.
A reliability assessment approach for ballast systems is presented in Chapter 5. The reliability
assessment approach is based on a RBD technique, and can be used to calculate the PFD of the
SIFs in the ballast system. The potential for CCFs among the components can be included in
the calculations, and the assessment is developed to give conservative estimates for reliability
performance. In Chapter 6 the reliability assessment approach is applied to the ballast system
of the Petrojarl Foinaven FPSO, as a case example of the approach.
A defense approach against CCFs in ballast systems is presented in Section 5.3. The defence ap-
proach can be implemented in the operational phase, to reduce the influence and reoccurence
of CCF during maintenance and testing of the ballast system components.
7.2 Discussion
Despite the importance of well functioning ballast systems on ships and floating facilities, and
a series of incidents and accidents where the unreliability of ballast systems have been a con-
tributing factor, not alot of research has been carried out within the field of ballast system reli-
ability. The requirements to these systems are still based on prescriptive maritime regulations,
although initiatives have been taken to include ballast systems under the performance based
regulations of the offshore industry. This has been done under the regulatory regime on the
NCS since 2004, as described in Section 2.
The typical ballast system presented in Chapter 3 is the result of simplifications making the
model applicable to a range of designs without losing the most important details. During actual
verifications, the simplification should be verified and the level of detail should be as high as
possible.
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The proposed reliability performance requirements of the ballast system functions are based on
the minimum SIL requirement approach of the OLF070 (2004) guideline. The requirements are
not especially strict. As part of a continuous improvement effort, the requirements should be
higher, but in line with the idea of the guideline, these requirements should be seen as minimum
requirements.
The strength of the proposed reliability assessment approach is the practical stepwise proce-
dure, and the flexible RBD modeling combined with conservative approximation formulaes for
reliability performance calculations. The reliability assessment can be performed without using
specialized software, and the contributions from CCFs can be included in the diagrams and cal-
culations. A limitation of the approach is that the RBDs can be quite large if a lot of details are
included in the assessment. If complex modeling is needed to assess a subsystem of a ballast
system, e.g. the control system, FTA can be used to model and quantify the PFD of the subsys-
tem, and subsequently include the results into the RBD.
The case example of the reliability assessment approach show that the proposed reliability per-
formance requirements can be achieved by performing functional tests at regular intervals, and
that the stepwise procedure may also identify important improvement potentials for ballast sys-
tems. A limitation of the case example is the lack of ship specific failure data that would have
increased the relevance of the results.
7.3 Recommendations for Further Work
In the suggested reliability assessment approach, the various SIFs are assessed individually, and
the effect of CCF is limited to the specific SIF being analysed. The first proposal for further work
is to investigate the dependency between the various SIFs, and the effect of CCF among different
SIFs.
The second proposal is to develop a detailed reliability assessment approach for ballast control
systems that can assess the true redundancy in the control system, and evaluate the spurious
trip and dangerous failure potential.
The third proposal is to develop a risk analysis methodology based on the possible outcomes of
ballast system fault states. The analysis can be based on extensive scenario modeling and ETA
techniques.
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Appendix A
Acronyms
AOC Acknowledgement of Compliance
BF Barrier function
CCF Common cause failure
D Dangerous failure
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DU Dangerous undetected failure
DD Dangerous detected failure
ETA Event Tree Analysis
EUC Equipment under control
FTA Fault tree analysis
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA Failure mode, effect and criticality analysis
FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading
HAZID Hazard identification
HEP Human error probability
HRA Human reliability analysis
I/O Input-output
MTTF Mean time to failure
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MTTR Mean time to repair
MooN M-out-of-N voting
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
NMA Norwegian Maritime Authority
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of a dangerous failure per hour]
P&ID Process and instrumentation diagram
QRA Quantitative risk analysis
LOPA Layer of protection analysis
RABL Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Loss
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability and safety
RPN Risk priority number
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented system
SIF Safety instrumented function
S Safe failure
SU Safe undetected failure
SD Safe detected failure
UPS Uninterruptible power sources
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Ballast  system  
Ballast  system  
configuration  
Ballast  valves  
Pump  room  
valves  
Seachest  valves  
Discharge  valves  
Ballast  pumps  
Electric  power  
system  
Main  electric  
power  generator  
Emergency  
backup  
generator  
UPS  
Hydraulic  power  
system  
Main  hydraulic  
power  generator  
Hydraulic  
accumulator  
Ballast  control  
system  
Ballast  control  
logic  
Figure B.1: Hierarchical breakdown of the ballast system
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6-2
Item Failure rate Data
(per hour) source
1. Ballast valves
Hydr. operated, butterfly
- Critical failure 12 10-6 OREDA
- Fail to close (per demand) 2 OREDA
- Blocked 1.7• 10-6 OREDA
- Faulty indication 15 10-6 OREDA
- Internal leakages (sign.) 3 . 10-6 OREDA
2. Check valve (hydr.system)
- All modes 3• 10-6 IEEE
3. Hydr. pipes (0<3”)
- All modes (pr. km) 0.5 . 107 Magpie
- Rupture/plugged 3 10-11 WASH 1400
(per section)
4. Hydr. power supply unit
- Critical 3• 10-6 OREDA
- Erratic control 7• 10-6 OREDA
5. Electronic control unit
(PLC, typical)
- Critical failure 30• 10-6 OREDA
6. Level indicator
- Critical 0.7k i06 OREDA/ZEEE
- Erratic output 0.4 . i-6 OREDA/IEEE
7. Pipe (ballast water)
- Sign. external leak (pr. km) 2 10 ICI
8. Ballast water pump system
- Fail while running 3.2 10 Study of ballast system
oil tanker
Veritec report 85-3410
- Fail to start (per demand) 10-2 OREDA
1 1. pi;-;i;1-,r1z1- f,,r r th hiIIt vttm
Figure B.2: RABL datasheet
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Table B.1: Stability incidents reported to the PSA
Date Facility (Built) Type Description Source
18.12.2000 Transocean
Arctic (1986)
Semi
sub.
Spurious trip of ballast pumps 1
12.02.1995 Transocean
Arctic (1986)
Semi
sub.
Spurious trip of ballast pump. Pump
overheated.
1
14.06.1995 Transocean
Arctic (1986)
Semi
sub.
Spurious stop of ballast pump after 1
minute. Fail while running.
1
01.12.1995 Transocean
Arctic (1986)
Semi
sub.
Unreliable level indicators in bal-
last tanks. 400-600mt deviation be-
tween calculated and observed dis-
placement.
1
18.04.1996 Transocean
Wildcat
Semi
sub.
Ballast pipe leakage close to seachest
valve.
1
13.08.1998 Transocean
Prospect
Semi
sub.
Failure in automatic ballast tank level
indicator
1
27.08.1998 Transocean
Prospect
Semi
sub.
Ballast control screen frozen image. 1
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Table B.2: Stability incidents reported to the PSA
Date Facility (Built) Type Description Source
21.01.1999 Polar Pioneer Semi
sub.
Overfilling of ballast tanks. Ballast wa-
ter migration through vent holes
1
09.08.1999 Transocean
Wildcat
Semi
sub.
Rig list due to forgotten ongoing grav-
ity filling of ballast tank
1
18.02.2000 Transocean
Arctic
Semi
sub.
Three incident of spurious trip of
same ballast pump within 48 hours
1
16.11.2000 Transocean
Wildcat
Semi
sub.
Water migration into open manhole
during ballasting for operational draft
1
22.01.2001 Polar Pioneer Semi
sub.
Failure in ballast tank level indicators 1
23.02.2001 Transocean
Wildcat
Semi
sub.
Leaking through ballast tank valve in
closed position during ballasting for
operational draft.
1
10.05.2001 Polar Pioneer Semi
sub.
Valve in ballast system leaking i closed
position
1
29.12.2001 Transocean
Arctic
Semi
sub.
Ballast valve failure during test. Dam-
age to the ringmain line due to sudden
water migration
1
05.05.2003 West Alpha Semi
sub.
Ballast tank valve leakage in closed
position
1
02.08.2004 Bideford Dol-
phin
Semi
sub.
Ballast tank valve leakage in closed
position
1
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Table B.3: Stability incidents reported to HSE (UK) 1980-2003
Date Facility
(Built)
Type Description Source
1986 N/A Semi
sub.
"A malfunction of the semi´s ballast control system
caused the rig to list 9 deg. before control was obtained
and the uprighted after 90minutes. Five helicopters heli-
copters flew in in case of evacuation".
2
1990 N/A Semi
sub.
"Electrical failure of power supply to ballast control sys-
tem. Ac output power inverter on ups tripped offline, bat-
tery backup to to systems feeds through the inverter and
was not able to come in to keep system running. Three
seperate operator stations were without power for ap-
prox. 8 min. until UPS was reset. No observable damage
was done to UPS system, nor can fault be duplicated. Bal-
last control system went into failsafe condition prevent-
ing loss of trim or stability. System was restored to full
operational capability."
2
1999 N/A Floating
pro-
duc-
tion
(details
un-
known)
Two gas alarms in production system."Possible software
anomalies also caused GT shutdown and starting failures
on emergency power generation. During the period of
power loss deluge activation occurred in a number of fire
zones due to loss of air pressure and a list of 5 degress
to Starboard developed due to the free flow of the bal-
last through open valves in the system. At no time was
the vessel in stability at risk and would have stabilized
at around 6-8 degrees once levels in the ballast tanks
had settled."Actions:"Manual intervention by emergency
teams to close ballast valves at local controls."
2
2000 N/A Semi
sub.
During exploratory drilling."Control of the starboard bal-
last desk was lost and all the remote operated valves went
to open position."Series of valves closed by manual in-
tervention. Rig trimmed to 6 degrees. Regained control.
Emergency scrambling. Coastguard informed.
2
2000 N/A Semi
sub.
Rig started listing. "On checking ballast panel noticed
all valves showing open & closed"A burst water line had
short circuited the starboard emergency ballast control
panel. Water intake stopped. Rig list 3 degrees. Starboard
ballast system stabilized.Rig trimmed using port ballast
system.
2
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Figure B.9: Foinaven ballast system flow diagram 2
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Figure B.10: Foinaven ballast system flow diagram 1
